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“The greatest boon which could be conferred on farmers and ditch-owners of 
California would be relief from the anxiety and expense of litigation over water 
rights.”—Elwood Mead, 19031 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE END OF THE CALIFORNIA EXCEPTION IN GROUNDWATER 
The rules of western water law obey western realities: this is a hallowed 
maxim. Begin with the reality of the western climate. Its harshness and aridity 
long ago dictated that western courts deviate from received common-law 
principles of reasonable and equitable use and adopt the doctrine of prior 
appropriation instead.2 Move on to the West’s topography; it must be respected 
so that it may be overcome. Because western rivers are often distant from good 
farmland, water rights must be severable from their native riparian lands so that 
water can be put to beneficial use on better soil downstream.3 Finally, there is the 
West’s pioneering legal culture. Because westerners mined before they farmed, 
and because they have always understood the necessities imposed upon them by 
aridity and topography, they have always embraced the legitimacy of the prior 
appropriation doctrine.4 Suspicious of corporate interests and land and water 
monopolies, they wisely forbade speculation in and hoarding of water supplies.5 
These rules and realities are self-evident and mutually reinforcing. Even Mexican 
irrigators bereft of the blessings of the common law recognized that rights to the 
San Pedro were most definitely not like those to the Thames.6 
But California follows different rules than the rest of the West. That is 
because California has its own natural realities, but also because California has 
the power to create artificial realities all its own—realities that exist nowhere 
else. California is thus an enduring insult to western conditions, to western 
sensibilities, and especially to western agriculture. There is no place like the San 
Joaquin Valley anywhere else in the West, much less the world. Acre for acre, it 
raised more wheat than any other state in the country, including Kansas when 
 
1.  ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
QUESTIONS CREATED BY THE GROWTH OF IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE WEST 197 (1903). 
2.  Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 553–54 (1872). 
3.  MEAD, supra note 1, at 169. 
4.  United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704 (1899). 
5.  DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS AND DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER 28–31 (2012). 
6.  Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339 (1909). 
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Kansas was the “Wheat State.”7 But because the valley is temperate and does not 
suffer hard freezes, its farmers soon migrated to more valuable crops such as 
vegetables, citrus, grapes, and berries.8 It is now home to the most lucrative crops 
grown in the United States—nut trees such as pistachios, almonds, and walnuts, 
not to mention pomegranates. Unlike populist movements in states such as 
Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas, which banned or limited corporate 
ownership of farmland, California has rarely scrupled about the power and 
efficiency of corporate agriculture. It secured the Central Valley Project during 
the 1930s to bring in water from as far away as Lake Shasta to the San Joaquin 
River Basin.9 Faced with the Reclamation Act’s quaint 160-acre limitation on 
federal irrigation water, California bonded the State Water Plan and the 
California Aqueduct to supply much larger farms.10 
Perhaps most exceptional of all, though, were the Central Valley’s 
groundwater supplies: plentiful, easy to access, recharged by percolation from the 
Coastal and Sierra Nevada Ranges, and wonderfully, intentionally, completely 
unregulated. Groundwater was the Central Valley’s “ace-in-the hole,” freely 
accessible during surface water restrictions.11 So much for the sanctimony of 
western courts, and of the “imperative necessity” of prior appropriation rights 
which rise to the “dignity of a distinct usufructuary estate.”12 Federal 
Reclamation water, state project water, and landowner-controlled groundwater 
together irrigate the Central Valley. For most of its 170-year-old history, 
agriculture across California has exploited the state’s exceptional natural 
bounties, employed an exceptional water-supply infrastructure for surface water, 
and steadfastly maintained a glaring legal exception for the permitting and 
regulation of groundwater. 
That exception is ending. Global climate change has reduced California’s 
greatest water resource, its Sierra Nevada snowpack. Global warming has 
delayed snowfall to later in the winter and advanced snowmelt to earlier in the 
spring, undercutting the assumptions of stationarity that were part of the design 
of federal and state water infrastructure engineered nearly a century ago. 
Reservoirs designed to capture and hold runoff through the summer months for 
irrigation use must now regularly release early spring inflows to avoid flooding.13 
Irrigators have also done their part. Over the past century they have over-pumped 
the Central Valley Aquifer to such an extent that its geological substrates have 
 
7.  MARK ARAX, THE DREAMT LAND: CHASING WATER AND DUST ACROSS CALIFORNIA 181 (2019). 
8.  MEAD, supra note 1, at 180–83. 
9.  NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A HISTORY 247–76 (rev. ed., 
2001). 
10.  Id. at 276–91. 
11.  Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of California Legal History, 6 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 269, 270–71 (2003). 
12.  Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446, 449 (1882). 
13.  PETER H. GLEICK, WATER: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE 
FOR WATER RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES 85 (2000). 
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collapsed and subsided by over thirty feet in some areas—probably the largest 
anthropogenic change in land-surface elevation in the world.14 
Over-pumping during the long drought that began in 2006 reached its literal 
breaking point during the 2010s, as land subsidence ruptured Central Valley 
canals—a tragicomic case of conjunctive mismanagement.15 Faced with a water-
supply failure from the summits of the Sierra Nevada to the subsurface of the San 
Joaquin Valley, California finally enacted comprehensive groundwater regulation 
legislation. As its title denotes, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act of 
2014 (“SGMA”) requires the sustainable management of the state’s 515 
groundwater basins, preferably through groundwater sustainability plans 
(“GSPs”) designed and approved by local groundwater sustainability agencies 
(“GSAs”).16 
SGMA is the most ambitious groundwater legislation in the United States in 
more than a generation, exceeding the goals of the Arizona Groundwater 
Management Act of 1980. The daunting problem of California groundwater 
overuse, and California’s sudden and firm commitment to achieving meaningful 
and ideally sustainable groundwater use, raise questions of the utmost importance 
for California agriculture. How will irrigators respond to SGMA’s statutory 
imperatives? Will they adopt and obey GSPs—management plans overlying their 
correlative property rights to use groundwater—or will they trigger groundwater 
adjudications to define their respective legal rights? In 2015, the California 
legislature anticipated this very question.17 If they focus on the former option, 
how will irrigators meet SGMA’s sustainability goals—by requiring increased 
irrigation efficiency, the permanent retirement of irrigated ground, rotational 
fallowing, categorical reductions in pumping, changes in cropping, or some 
mixture of all the above? How will GSPs confront longstanding tensions among 
groundwater irrigators, municipalities, underserved water communities, and 
conservationists concerned about groundwater-dependent ecosystems? Policy 
options, including water markets, abound. If irrigators pursue the adjudicatory 
route, how will California courts reconcile SGMA with California’s correlative 
rights groundwater regime, and how will courts confront their own inconsistent 
precedents from past adjudications? Are GSPs that go too far in reducing 
groundwater pumping vulnerable to takings challenges? Are groundwater 
adjudications that confirm SGMA-induced pumping reductions vulnerable as 
judicial takings? Ultimately, what does “sustainability” even mean for California 
groundwater—and California agriculture? These are rich policy and legal 
 
14.  William M. Alley et al., Sustainability of Ground-Water Resources, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
CIRCULAR 1186, at 20 (1993). 
15.  Bettina Boxall, Overpumping of Central Valley Groundwater Creating a Crisis, Experts Say, L.A. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2015. 
16.  CAL. WATER CODE § 10720.1 (West 2020). 
17.  Id. §§ 10720.1(i), 10720.5(c), 10737.2. 
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questions. Irrigators, groundwater managers, water lawyers, think tanks, and 
California’s State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) are wrestling 
with them as they work through the SGMA process. 
Most of these and other questions are presently unanswerable; it is simply 
too early in the SGMA process to know. Like other states, California has, 
through SGMA, enacted groundwater management legislation that knowingly 
avoids or fundamentally conflicts with longstanding property doctrines in 
groundwater. This is demonstrable proof that both the water law doctrines 
themselves and the owners who putatively enjoy their protections have failed to 
protect the groundwater systems upon which their rights depend—that is, to 
achieve a functionally sustainable groundwater supply. In this regard, California 
is anything but exceptional. Yet the end of California’s water exceptionalness has 
a bright side. California’s legislative recognition of its own failures in 
groundwater management, and SGMA’s commitment to address those failures, 
provide an opportunity to glean lessons from other states that have recognized 
and reacted to similar structural and doctrinal failures. Specifically, there is an 
opportunity to review how irrigators themselves have devised binding 
groundwater management plans that achieve substantial but tolerable reductions 
in groundwater use. In many of California’s over-drafted groundwater basins, the 
hardest question will be how to allocate groundwater supplies among large 
numbers of overlying irrigators.18 
For the myriad of questions that SGMA raises, this question may have useful 
and timely answers found elsewhere—specifically, in the recent Kansas 
groundwater experience. This Article brings that experience to bear upon SGMA 
and finds a fair amount of promise there. Part I provides a brief schematic survey 
of the large and complex subject of California groundwater law, by describing its 
founding doctrinal and jurisdictional principles, its evolution through 
groundwater adjudications, and the contours of the modern California 
groundwater right itself. With this survey as background, Part I concludes with a 
description of the structure and substance of SGMA, emphasizing the challenges 
it faces in negotiating between state and local control, between hydrological and 
legal realities, and between collective groundwater management and individual 
rights adjudication. Part II provides a similar survey of Kansas groundwater law, 
starting with its statutory beginnings in 1945 through the groundwater revolution 
of the late 1950s through the 1970s, a period which quietly but effectively 
transformed groundwater doctrine and created jurisdictional divides between 
state and local control. These developments produced the modern Kansas 
groundwater right, an often-awkward hybrid combining the doctrinal features of 
prior appropriation with effective operational features suggestive of the 
reasonable use and correlative rights doctrines. By the turn of the twenty-first 
 
18.  Eric Garner et al., The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act and the Common Law of 
Groundwater Rights—Finding a Consistent Path Forward for Groundwater Allocation, 38 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 163, 201 (2020). 
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century, Kansas faced similar polarities that California now faces with SGMA: 
polarities between state and local jurisdiction, between hydrological and legal 
realities, and between the policy imperatives of collective management and the 
stubborn facts of individual rights. 
Why look to Kansas of all places? Despite the hydrological, jurisdictional, 
and doctrinal differences between California and Kansas groundwater, there is 
nonetheless a compelling structural similarity across both states. Both states have 
recently enacted important legislation to address the problem of groundwater 
depletion: Kansas created a new type of groundwater management area—the 
Local Enhanced Management Area (“LEMA”) in 2012—while California 
enacted SGMA in 2014. Out of both political and practical necessity, each state 
has assigned the problem to local agencies, which in western Kansas and the 
Central Valley are dominated by irrigators and agribusiness interests. 
With these similarities in mind, Part III of this Article reviews the most 
prominent features of collective groundwater management plans in Kansas—
especially those common to the three LEMAs that have been established across 
the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer since 2013. These are not small areas: 
collectively, they comprise over 5,500 square miles, roughly the size of 
Connecticut. Irrigators have put these plans together relatively quickly. Yet the 
choices they have so far made to achieve meaningful groundwater conservation 
have been revealingly consistent, both in their shared sense of what constitutes 
substantial but tolerable reductions in groundwater use, but also in their 
essentially equitable apportionment of how to achieve those reductions—choices 
that reveal a deliberate ambivalence about the governing doctrines of Kansas 
water law. These findings provide grounds for optimism about SGMA’s future. 
Part IV distills the Kansas groundwater management experience into a series of 
conclusions that may be of use to those working through the demands of the 
SGMA process in California. Because they originate in such different legal 
contexts, the Kansas and California groundwater experiences may even provide 
principled instructions for achieving meaningful groundwater conservation 
across the West—a useful template for every state in between them. 
II. CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW: A SCHEMATIC REVIEW 
A. The Founding Principles 
California groundwater law essentially rests upon a tripod of common-law 
doctrine, statutory jurisdiction, and the constitutional rule of reasonable use. 
Because every leg of the tripod consists of roughly joined segments, the legal 
tripod has wobbled for over a century. 
The common-law doctrinal leg is that of correlative rights, established in 
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Katz v. Walkinshaw over a century ago and complicated regularly ever since.19 
Katz rejected the rule of capture for groundwater and replaced it with the 
correlative rights doctrine, which allocates a usufructuary right to a “fair and just 
portion” of the groundwater supply to each overlying landowner.20 These rights 
are similar to riparian rights, because they can be asserted at any time, and 
subsequent correlative rights are entitled to equal dignity with existing rights.21 
Where the groundwater basin is in a condition of overdraft—that is, where the 
groundwater supply exceeds the safe annual yield of the groundwater basin—
then use is restricted to overlying landowners based on their reasonable needs.22 
Yet where groundwater is available in excess of overdraft, and overlying owners 
do not need such surplus water, then the correlative rights doctrine allows for 
appropriative rights; put another way, out-of-basin pumpers who are pumping 
within a basin’s safe yield are treated as appropriators.23 Because some of the 
most important groundwater disputes in California history have concerned 
conflicts between out-of-basin users (usually cities and municipal water 
providers) and in-basin users (often irrigators), determinations of whether a basin 
is in overdraft, and what constitutes safe yield, have been fundamental to 
deciding whether valid appropriative rights exist under the correlative rights 
doctrine.24 As briefly discussed below in Section I.B., these conflicts eventually 
provided California courts with an opportunity to recognize significant 
modifications of the correlative rights doctrine: those of prescription and, later, of 
mutual prescription. Under these modifications, each non-overlying pumper in a 
groundwater basin can acquire prescriptive rights against both overlying owners 
and prior appropriators by pumping in excess of safe yield for the prescriptive 
period.25 
California’s common-law correlative rights doctrine thus actually 
incorporates three doctrinal segments. It limits in-basin, on-parcel water use to a 
fair and proportionate share. It allows for out-of-basin, off-parcel appropriative 
rights, provided groundwater supplies are available in excess of safe yield. And 
under certain adjudicated situations, it recognizes prescriptive rights for out-of-
basin pumpers. 
The second wobbly leg of California groundwater law is jurisdiction. Under 
§ 1200 of the California Water Code, originally enacted in 1913, the SWRCB has 
 
19.  Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (1903). 
20.  Id. at 136. 
21.  Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 154 Cal. 428, (1908); see Marion Kirkwood, Appropriation of 
Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (1948). 
22.  Tehachapi-Cummings Cty. Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 925–27 (1975). What 
constitutes “overlying land” or “overlying use” has not been clearly defined, but in-basin pumpers qualify as 
overlying landowners. ANTHONY DAN TARLOCK & JASON ANTHONY ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND 
RESOURCES § 4.14, at 194 (2020 ed.). 
23.  TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 22, at 194. 
24.  City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 224 (1975). 
25.  City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 908 (1949); TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 
22, § 4.17, at 199. 
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permitting and regulatory authority over surface waters of the state, which 
includes “subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.”26 
The third category of California water—percolating groundwater—is beyond the 
state’s jurisdiction and is not subject to statutory adjudications.27 This leg extends 
back to 1899, when the California Supreme Court decided Los Angeles v. 
Pomeroy, a quintessential case of legal instrumentalism.28 Pomeroy was an 
eminent domain case concerning the value of a narrow strip of land adjacent to 
the Los Angeles River. If the alluvial groundwater beneath the condemned land 
could be classified as a “subterranean stream,” then it was legally part of the 
river; therefore, Los Angeles did not have to pay compensation for the strip’s 
water supplies because the city held recognized pueblo rights to the river. But if 
the water was instead “percolating water,” it was part of the condemned estate in 
land, and the city would have to pay compensation for the water’s value—
because prior to Katz, the rule of capture (or absolute ownership) was widely 
perceived as the prevailing rule for percolating groundwater in California.29 The 
judicial assumption or premise that the rule of capture governed groundwater 
created the need, under the circumstances of Pomeroy, for California’s 
“subterranean stream doctrine.”30 As Professor Sax has written: 
 
[E]ither Los Angeles had to lose a case that the court undoubtedly 
believed the city deserved to win, or the court had to look to a legal 
theory that solved the immediate problem before it, but created a 
hydrologically untenable distinction among groundwater at different 
stages of its voyage through the San Fernando Valley. The Pomeroy 
court chose to decide in favor of a result that protected Los Angeles’ 
treasury at the expense of a coherent legal theory.31 
 
Section 1200 effectively codified Los Angeles v. Pomeroy. Ever since, 
California courts and the SWRCB have struggled with applying the antiquated 
legal categories of “subterranean streams” and “known and definite channels” to 
long-known hydrological realities.32 Such categories “are inapt, and efforts to fit 
water into the law’s categories by using these technical-sounding classifications 
 
26.  CAL. WATER § 1200 (West 2020). 
27.  Id. § 2500. 
28.  City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597 (1899). 
29.  Sax, supra note 11, at 276–80. 
30.  Id. at 280, 283. 
31.  Id. at 280. 
32.  For example, in N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1577, 
1585–86 (2006), the SWRCB successfully defended its interpretation of Section 1200 and Pomeroy according 
to a four-part test for determining jurisdiction that it had developed internally following a 1999 decision, In re 
Garrapata Water Co., State Wat. Res. Control Bd. Dec. No. 1639 (June 17, 1999). 
University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 52 
503 
give the enterprise a somewhat daffy air.”33 Like their judicial counterparts in 
other western states that segregate their legal regimes for surface and 
groundwater, California judges faced with deciding these classifications lament 
the segregation.34 Because “percolating groundwater” is thus outside of the 
state’s jurisdiction, the regulation of groundwater pumping in California was, 
until SGMA, entirely a matter of local regulation. Indeed, the most 
knowledgeable water law expert on the California bench wrote nearly fifty years 
ago that it is indeed “curious that although regulation of surface waters is 
properly a responsibility of the State, groundwater regulation is somehow viewed 
as a ‘local’ concern . . . .”35 
The third (and most stable) leg of the California groundwater tripod is the 
constitutional rule of reasonable use—the most important component of modern 
California water law.36 This leg owes its existence to a San Joaquin Valley case, 
Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co.37 In Herminghaus, the 
California Supreme Court held that the riparian doctrine, established alongside 
that of prior appropriation for surface use,38 entitled riparian landowners to 
nothing less than the entire flow of the San Joaquin River on the grounds that it 
“constitutes a reasonable use thereof within the intent and meaning” of the 
English common law which California had adopted at statehood—thereby 
blocking any appropriation of the river’s water supply by an upstream utility.39 
Riparian landowners thus held vested rights to the river’s full flows, even if they 
used the water wastefully.40 The court’s pure and severe application of the 
riparian rights doctrine, and the waste and impracticality it explicitly condoned, 
provoked public outrage and an immediate public reaction. By popular initiative, 
California amended its constitution in 1928 to prohibit unreasonable use: “the 
right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream . . . 
shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required . . . and such right 
 
33.  Sax, supra note 11, at 273. 
34.  See, e.g., N. Gualala Water Co., 139 Cal. App. 4th at 1590–91, (“As the present case illustrates, 
classification disputes in this field quickly take on an Alice-in-Wonderland quality because the legal categories 
. . . are drawn from antiquated case law and bear little or no relationship to hydrological realities.”); Collier v. 
Arizona Dept. of Water Res., 722 P.2d 363, 366 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (“Arizona water law has developed into a 
bifurcated [legal] system in which percolating groundwater is regulated under a set of laws completely distinct 
from the laws regulating surface water. While this bifurcation provides a workable legal system, it often ignores 
the scientific reality that groundwater and surface water are often connected.”); Spear T Ranch, Inc., v. Knaub, 
269 Neb. 177, 183 (Neb. 2005) (“But Nebraska water law ignores the hydrological fact that ground water and 
surface water are inextricably linked. Instead of an integrated system, we have two separate systems, one 
allocating streamflows and the other allocating ground water.”). 
35.  Sax, supra note 11, at 301 (quoting now-Justice Ronald Robie, when he was a lawyer for the 
SWRCB in 1973). 
36.  HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 245 (quoting GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER 
RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 9 (1978)). 
37.  200 Cal. 81 (1926). 
38.  Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 349 (1886). 
39.  Herminghaus v. Southern California Electric Co., 200 Cal. 81, 104–05, 111–12 (1926). 
40.  HUNDLEY, supra note 9, at 245. 
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does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use . . . of water.”41 
The reasonable use requirement, once a “sleeping giant” of California water law, 
has awakened and stalked the law as a “Bigfoot” at least since the 1970s.42 
The amendment essentially reversed Herminghaus and adjusted the 
relationship between California’s two categories of surface water rights—riparian 
rights and appropriative rights.43 But the constitutional language is more 
expansive, encompassing “the right to water,” of which the right “to the use or 
flow of water in or from any natural stream” is a part.44 That expansiveness 
makes sense given the earlier decision in Katz to adopt the principle of 
reasonable use that animates the correlative rights doctrine. As the court in Katz 
noted, only if there is groundwater in excess of the reasonable needs of the 
overlying owners may water be exported for use on non-overlying lands.45 
Modern case law has confirmed the importance of the reasonable use limitation 
for California groundwater.46 Reasonable use is “an inherent limitation on all 
water rights” in California, whether they are subject to the SWRCB’s jurisdiction 
or not.47 As the California Supreme Court noted, “the courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the legislatively established administrative agencies to enforce 
the self-executing provisions of Article X, section 2. Private parties thus may 
seek court aid in the first instance to prevent unreasonable water use . . . .”48 
Within the context of integrating the management of surface water and 
groundwater supplies, courts have constitutional authority “to unify the law of 
surface and groundwater rights situationally where unintegrated management and 
regulation would result in unreasonable use. And the courts have this 
constitutional power despite the general legal distinction [in California] between 
the surface water and groundwater systems.”49 
 
41.  CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (originally codified as CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3). 
42.  HARRISON DUNNING, WATER ALLOCATION IN CALIFORNIA: LEGAL RIGHTS AND REFORM NEEDS 29 
(1982); Brian E. Gray, In Search of Bigfoot: The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the California 
Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 225, 226, 272 (1989). 
43.  Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 363–64, 384 (1935). 
44.  CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
45.  Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135–36 (1903). As Professor Gray has noted, the decision in Katz 
to modify the common law of groundwater by incorporating the doctrine of reasonable use was an effort to 
ensure that “the law comports with the environment and economy of California . . . .” Gray, supra note 42, 257 
n.163. 
46.  Light v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 226 Cal App. 4th 1463, 1479 (2014), as modified of denial of 
reh’g (July 11, 2014) (quoting People ex. Rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. V. Forni, 54 Cal App. 3d 743, 
750 (1976)) (“The rule of reasonableness is now ‘the overriding principle governing the use of water in 
California.’”); see, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 138 Cal. App. 4th 1261, 1279 (2006) 
(“Allegretti’s [groundwater right] is nonetheless restricted to a reasonable beneficial use consistent with article 
X, section 2 of the California Constitution.”). 
47.  Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W-NW J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2002). 
48.  Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Utility Dist., 26 Cal. 3d 183, 200 (1980). 
49.  Brian E. Gray, The Reasonable Use Doctrine in California Water Law and Policy, in ALLISON 
LASSITER ED., SUSTAINABLE WATER: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS FROM CALIFORNIA 83, 97 (2015). 
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Placed on the ground of the Central Valley, the legal tripod of California 
groundwater can be shortened, simplified, and stabilized—at least for the 
comparative purposes of this Article. The valley is dominated by irrigators using 
groundwater on their own lands or within their respective groundwater basins, 
where pumping substantially exceeds safe yield conditions. Thus, the common-
law doctrinal leg can be simplified by ignoring the complexities of appropriative 
rights and mutual prescription—complexities that have driven the most 
prominent adjudications of California groundwater.50 The jurisdictional leg can 
be similarly simplified by collapsing surface water and “subterranean streams,” 
leaving only the “percolating” groundwater of the Central Valley Aquifer—
supplies that are safely beyond the SWRCB’s jurisdictional reach pursuant to 
§ 1200 of the California Water Code. Admittedly, this simplification ignores 
some of the Valley’s most important water supplies. These include the Kings, 
Kern, and San Joaquin Rivers and their alluvial aquifers, which supply 
groundwater-dependent ecosystems such as the Kern and Pixley National 
Wildlife Refuges, precious remnants of what used to be Tulare Lake. Such 
supplies are regulated under distinct state and federal legal regimes.51 Because 
this Article is limited to how groundwater irrigators can reach consensus over 
their mutual use of the Central Valley Aquifer, it treats this groundwater supply 
largely as geologists do—as a single, functionally unconfined, and heterogeneous 
aquifer, in which the vertical movement of groundwater depends primarily on the 
properties of the aquifer’s fine-grained sediments and the local influences of 
irrigators’ high-capacity wells.52 The third constitutional leg does not need 
simplification: California’s constitutional command of reasonable use extends to 
all of the groundwater supplies of the Valley.53 For the purposes of this Article, 
these simplifications seem reasonable enough. 
B. The Principles, Adjudicated 
The long and tortured history of California groundwater adjudications 
generally shows that such a legal simplification is tolerable, because the courts 
have not made a fetish of received doctrine. These adjudications can be divided 
into four phases.54 The first phase began in 1949 when the California Supreme 
 
50.  See generally WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS (1992); see infra Section I.B. 
51.  The water supplies of national wildlife refuges enjoy substantial protections under federal wildlife 
law. See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(1) (2020) (effective 
Oct. 30, 1998). 
52.  THOMAS E. REILLY ET AL., GROUND-WATER AVAILABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1323, at 44 (2008). 
53.  Garner et al., supra note 18, at 185. 
54.  This and the following several paragraphs rely substantially on a recent analysis of California 
groundwater adjudications, see generally, Leon Szeptycki et al., A Flexible Framework or Rigid Doctrine? 
Assessing the Legacy of the 2000 Mojave Decision for Resolving Disputes over Groundwater in California, 37 
STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 185, 211–38 (2018). The author would like to extend his thanks to two of the article’s 
authors, Professor Szeptycki and Professor William Blomquist, for their helpful discussions of these 
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Court decided City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, a case concerning the long-
overdrafted Western Unit of the Raymond Basin.55 The adjudication pitted two 
archetypical groundwater interests against each other—cities that were not 
overlying landowners and longstanding irrigators who were. Under the 
correlative rights doctrine of Katz, the cities—as appropriators—risked losing 
their share of the safe yield of the basin. Conversely, under the doctrine of 
prescriptive rights, overlying irrigators and other pumpers risked losing their 
water rights to the cities. Faced with the real risk posed by these doctrinal 
polarities, the parties reached a settlement and stipulated judgment that relied 
upon a simple principle: all parties would reduce their pumping by a proportional 
amount necessary to restore the basin to safe yield.56 That principle ripened into 
the doctrinal innovation of mutual prescription, which ultimately justified the 
settlement: all of the pumpers had established equal rights of mutual prescription 
against each other because the basin was overdrafted. Thus, all of the water users 
were required to proportionately reduce their pumping to correct that overdraft, 
regardless of their status as appropriator or overlying landowner.57 The result of 
the mutual prescription doctrine—proportionate reductions regardless of 
pumping class—was probably more important than the doctrine itself. That is 
because the result gave the court grounds to approve the settlement based on 
more general rules of equity and the public interest.58 City of Pasadena’s 
“doctrinal choreography” of mutual prescription, and its practical equity of 
proportionate reductions, provided a template for many groundwater 
adjudications for the next several decades.59 
The dancing changed in 1975 when the California Supreme Court issued its 
decision in City of Los Angeles v. San Fernando, a decades-long, highly complex 
case involving mostly municipal groundwater interests.60 The trial court followed 
the methodology of City of Pasadena—mutual prescription and proportionate 
reductions—but the Supreme Court reversed, changing California groundwater 
adjudication law in two important ways. First, it announced a newfound 
hesitancy about prescriptive rights (and proportionate reductions) because 
municipalities and other public entities—often the largest water users involved in 
such adjudications—were immune from prescription. That returned the factually 
complicated matter of determining individual groundwater rights to the center of 
the adjudicatory process. Second, the California Supreme Court introduced the 
methodology of equitable apportionment as an alternative approach to 
 
adjudications and other issues involving California groundwater. 
55.  City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 921–22 (1949); BLOMQUIST, supra note 48, at 
79–80. 
56.  Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 194. 
57.  City of Pasadena, 33 Cal. 2d at 935. 
58.  Id. at 933. 
59.  Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 194. 
60.  City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975). 
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adjudicating groundwater use—a methodology used by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in interstate water litigation.61 Although in dicta, the recourse to 
equitable apportionment made sense as a practical critique of mutual 
prescription. However, it was an odd choice doctrinally. As of the date of the San 
Fernando decision, the interstate cases which had actually accomplished 
interstate allocations were primarily those involving western states which 
followed the prior appropriation doctrine.62 Thus, for priority of appropriation to 
be a “guiding principle” in California groundwater adjudications clashed with the 
state’s longstanding adherence to the correlative rights doctrine.63 San 
Fernando’s departure from Pasadena killed that adjudication, created serious 
problems for subsequent adjudications, and produced a disconcerting level of 
uncertainty about the actual attributes of a California groundwater right.64 
That uncertainty continued as a consequence of the third major groundwater 
adjudication in California, City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency (“Mojave”), 
decided in 2000.65 In fighting the last war, as lawyers are wont to do, most of the 
parties to this extraordinarily complex adjudication followed the apparent 
precepts and practical commands of San Fernando. They pursued a settlement 
path guided by equitable apportionment, as well as a deliberate avoidance of 
strictly determining or enforcing individual rights, on the grounds that such 
strictness would likely violate the California Constitution’s commands of 
reasonable use and the avoidance of waste.66 The California Supreme Court once 
again changed directions and rejected that approach. It rejected the use of 
equitable apportionment that it had apparently blessed in San Fernando for 
determining groundwater allocations between overlying owners, appropriators, 
and those claiming prescriptive rights. It rejected the avoidance of classifying and 
prioritizing individual rights as rationalized by Article X, Section 2 of the state 
constitution.67 
After Mojave, neither the practical instrumentalism of mutual prescriptive 
rights as established in Pasadena in 1949 nor the collective approach of equitable 
 
61.  Id. at 265 & n.61 (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
62.  See, e.g., Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922) (equitable apportionment based primarily 
on the respective states’ adherence to the prior appropriation doctrine); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 
618 (1945) (equitable apportionment based on prior appropriation but including other important factors as well). 
Since 1945, the Supreme Court of the United States has not equitably apportioned interstate water supplies. The 
Court maintained its general allegiance to prior appropriation as a guiding principle for equitable apportionment 
in Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), and again in the same case, Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 
U.S. 310 (1984). 
63.  City of Los Angeles, 14 Cal. 3d at 266 & n.61 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 
(1945). 
64.  Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 197–200. 
65.  City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th 1224 (2000). 
66.  Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 205–06. 
67.  Mojave Water Agency, 23 Cal. 4th at 1243–50. For a detailed history of the case, see J. M. Miller, 
When Equity Is Unfair—Upholding Long-Standing Principles of California Water Law in City of Barstow v. 
Mojave Water Agency, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 991 (2001). 
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allocation blessed in San Fernando in 1975 were legally viable methods of 
adjudicating groundwater rights. Mojave can be read pessimistically as 
reaffirming a formalistic and individualistic approach to adjudicating 
groundwater rights—a discouraging development given the cost and complexity 
of adjudications.68 Yet Mojave can also be read optimistically, seeing in the 
decision the potential to accommodate the recognition of individual rights and 
priorities without foreclosing the ability of the parties and the trial courts to reach 
creative and effective resolutions of groundwater adjudications.69 A recent 
empirical study analyzed the seven groundwater adjudications that have been 
completed since Mojave, to evaluate the case’s actual effects on those 
adjudications and to limn any lessons they may hold for the design and 
implementation of GSPs under SGMA.70 Its authors reached a number of 
encouraging conclusions. In five of the seven adjudications, the parties and the 
courts reached relatively quick settlements using creative groundwater 
management solutions—and, importantly, by finessing the property rights rules 
for California groundwater.71 They did so largely by “effectively adopting a clear 
rule of supremacy of overlying rights, while also setting up a system for 
reallocating those rights to urban users into the future.”72 
C. SGMA 
California long resisted the regulation of groundwater under a permit system, 
largely because of opposition from irrigation interests in the San Joaquin 
Valley.73 But the long drought that began at least in 2006 forced the state to 
recognize the crisis caused by unregulated pumping. In typical California 
fashion, it enacted SGMA—a comprehensive regulatory plan for California 
groundwater. It took effect on January 1, 2015, and amendments clarifying its 
legislative intent took effect in 2016.74 SGMA fills twelve chapters of the 
California Water Code, along with multiple cross-references to existing 
procedures for groundwater adjudications. Reduced to its essentials, SGMA 
pursues two goals: (1) the sustainable management of the state’s groundwater 
 
68.  See, e.g., Eric Garner, Right Back Where We Started from: The Last 25 Years of Groundwater Law in 
California, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 413 (2005). 
69.  See, e.g., R. McGlothlin & J. Acos, The Golden Rule* of Water Management, 9 GOLDEN GATE 
ENVTL. L. J. 109 (2016). 
70.  Szeptycki et al., supra note 52, at 188. 
71.  Id. at 185–86. 
72.  Id. at 211. 
73.  Barbara Andrews & Sally Fairfax, Groundwater and Intergovernmental Relations in the Southern 
San Joaquin Valley of California: What Are All These Cooks Doing to the Broth?, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 145, 
152–53 (1984). 
74.  For a procedural history of the enactment of the SGMA, see Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times 
Call for Sensible Measures: The Making of the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9 
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5 (2016). 
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basins; and (2) the achievement of that goal primarily through the work of local 
agencies, rather than the SWRCB or the state Department of Water Resources 
(“DWR”).75 
SGMA defines what is sustainable for groundwater usage—whether as a 
“sustainability goal,” “sustainable groundwater management,” or “sustainable 
yield.” Within the historical context of California’s groundwater adjudications 
between Pasadena and Mojave, these are terms suggestive of layers of common-
law definitions.76 But as a statute, SGMA defines sustainability as something that 
avoids an “undesirable result,” which consists of the following: 
 
(1) Chronic lowering of groundwater levels indicating a significant and 
unreasonable depletion of supply if continued over the planning and 
implementation horizon. Overdraft during a period of drought is not 
sufficient to establish a chronic lowering of groundwater levels if 
extractions and groundwater recharge are managed as necessary to 
ensure that reductions in groundwater levels or storage during a period of 
drought are offset by increases in groundwater levels or storage during 
other periods. 
(2) Significant and unreasonable reduction of groundwater storage. 
(3) Significant and unreasonable seawater intrusion. 
(4) Significant and unreasonable degraded water quality, including the 
migration of contaminant plumes that impair water supplies. 
(5) Significant and unreasonable land subsidence that substantially 
interferes with surface land uses. 
(6) Depletions of interconnected surface water that have significant and 
unreasonable adverse impacts on beneficial uses of the surface water.77 
 
Notably, these “undesirable results” are themselves qualified by what 
decision-makers determine to be both “significant” and “unreasonable.” They are 
not to be confused with how a hydrogeologist would determine sustainability.78 
SGMA next sets forth the procedures by which to achieve this definition of 
sustainable groundwater management. While local agencies take the lead, the 
state plays an important supervisory role. SGMA either recognizes existing local 
agencies or allows a local agency or combination of agencies to decide to 
become the GSA for their overlying groundwater basin.79 Once the GSA has 
been formed, and the state has recognized it, the GSA’s primary duty is to 
develop a binding GSP. SGMA requires that GSAs for high- and medium-
 
75.  CAL. WATER § 10720.1 (West 2020). 
76.  Garner et al., supra note 18, at 173–77. 
77.  CAL. WATER § 10721(x). 
78.  For a critique of the SGMA’s approach to sustainable yield, see John J. Perona, A Dry Century in 
California: Climate Change, Groundwater, and a Science-Based Approach for Preserving the Unseen 
Commons, 45 ENVTL. L. REV. 641 (2015). 
79.  CAL. WATER § 10723. 
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priority basins complete their GSPs by 2020 or 2022, depending upon the basin; 
the DWR had earlier established the priority of these basins.80 Many GSPs have 
already been submitted, and several propose retiring groundwater-irrigated 
acreage as a means to reach SGMA’s sustainability goals. Indeed, permanent 
land fallowing may be an unpleasant feature of GSPs in primarily agricultural 
areas such as the San Joaquin Valley.81 
Once the GSP is adopted, it must achieve its sustainability goals within 
twenty years, but extensions of five to ten years and even longer are available if 
the GSA can show good cause for the extension.82 Importantly, the GSP must 
consider the interests of all beneficial users of groundwater and not just those 
who hold water rights; the latter include environmental users of groundwater, 
Native American tribes, and disadvantaged communities.83 DWR reviews the 
local GSP to ensure compliance with SGMA’s sustainability goals, and it must 
review the plan at least every five years.84 
SGMA similarly divides the power to regulate pumping to achieve the 
sustainability goals of the GSP. The GSAs are endowed with clear authority to 
require wells to be registered and equipped with meters.85 They can also impose 
well spacing on new wells, regulate pumping to minimize well interference, and 
even suspend pumping to meet the requirements of the GSP.86 GSAs also have 
the power to impose civil penalties against pumpers who violate the specific rules 
of the GSP, or bring a court action to do the same.87 Again, the state serves as the 
backstop: if the SWRCB determines that a GSP is deficient in meeting SGMA’s 
sustainability goals, it can intervene and place the basin on probationary status, 
identify the plan’s problems, and develop its own interim plan as necessary—
until the GSA reforms its GSP.88 While SGMA seeks to secure a maximum 
degree of local control, it is consistently clear that the state, through DWR and 
the SWRCB, will oversee the management process to ensure that local GSAs are 
in fact meeting the act’s sustainability goals.89 
The most telling aspect of SGMA is its treatment of water rights. There is a 
clear tension within the Act between the security of groundwater rights 
established according to California property law and the sustainability goals 
imposed by SGMA.90 SGMA attempts to alleviate this tension by consistently 
 
80.  Id. §§ 10720.7, 10933(b)(8). 
81.  TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 22, § 4.15, at 198. 
82.  CAL. WATER § 10727.2. 
83.  Id. § 10723.2. 
84.  Id. §§ 10733, 10733.4, 10733.8. 
85.  Id. §§ 10725.6, 10725.8. 
86.  Id. § 10726.4. 
87.  Id. §§ 10726.4, 10732. 
88.  CAL. WATER §§ 10735.2, 10735.4, 10735.8, 10736. 
89.  Id. § 10725. 
90.  Id. § 10720.1. For an excellent recent discussion of this tension, see Garner et al., supra note 18. 
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deferring to the former: it takes pains to state that the act neither determines 
property rights in the use of groundwater established at common law, nor 
functions as a commentary on them.91 The local agencies have no power to create 
such property rights: GSAs do not have the power to issue well permits, and 
GSPs do not function as a determination of groundwater rights.92 SGMA 
similarly defers to the groundwater adjudication process: adjudicated basins are 
mostly exempt from SGMA’s requirements, but ongoing adjudications must be 
managed to minimize interference with a GSP.93 The 2015 amendments to 
SGMA were generally focused on streamlining the adjudication process for 
groundwater basins, so that adjudications could not raise procedural opportunities 
to delay the implementation of GSPs in high- and medium-priority basins.94 
D. The Coming Collisions in the post-SGMA Legal Landscape 
The enactment of SGMA in 2014 has forced the statutory imperative of 
sustainability upon the legal regime of California groundwater. As a 
consequence, massive collisions almost certainly await. Begin with the property 
right in California groundwater: it is the logical starting place.95 The individual, 
overlying right was conceived over a century ago according to the correlative 
rights doctrine in Katz. It fell under the governance of the constitutional mandate 
of reasonable use. It has endured the instrumentalist and doctrinal oscillations 
created by adjudications ever since Pasadena—oscillations largely forced by 
relentless municipal growth. But in agriculturally dominated basins such as the 
San Joaquin Valley, SGMA has forced the right to confront its own attributes, as 
legal doctrine collides with groundwater depletion. What was reasonable in the 
pre-SGMA world is not sustainable in a post-SGMA world. 
The other collisions are similarly daunting and probably unavoidable. Local 
GSA control of the GSP will likely collide with the state’s power to take over the 
process if DWR and the SWRCB find the GSP to be deficient. The 
administrative law and procedure of SGMA will collide with the legal process of 
adjudications. Agricultural interests and overlying pumpers will predictably 
collide with municipalities and other parties with appropriative and prescriptive 
rights and claims. And in primarily agricultural basins, there will be collisions 
between agricultural interests themselves: between resident and non-resident 
growers, as well as between longer-established growers of traditional Central 
Valley crops and arriviste nut growers.96 
 
91.  See CAL. WATER §§ 10720.5, 10720.8. 
92.  Id. § 10726.4. 
93.  Id. § 10720.8. 
94.  Id. §§ 10720.1(i), 10720.5(c), 10737.2. 
95.  Garner et al., supra note 18. 
96.  ARAX, supra note 7, at 299–341 (describing the agricultural empire of the Wonderful Company and 
its founder, Stewart Resnick, of Beverly Hills, a non-agricultural region of southern California). 
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III. KANSAS GROUNDWATER LAW: A SCHEMATIC REVIEW 
Kansas used to resemble the Central Valley. Millions of years ago, its 
western portion was a vast inland sea, even bigger than Tulare Lake. At the end 
of the last ice age—about 12,000 years ago—it received the sands, gravels, and 
melting glacial waters of the Rocky Mountains, which together deposited 
themselves into what is now the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer. When Kansas 
became a territory in 1854, its western boundary extended to the eastern slope of 
the Colorado Rockies, giving it territorial rights to mountain rivers, such as the 
South Platte and the Arkansas. But once Kansans became aware of these 
blessings, they did not last very long. The Colorado Gold Rush of 1859 
convinced Kansas territory to cede its western holdings to Colorado in 1861. A 
decade or so later, Kansas surface irrigators started diverting the Arkansas River 
near the state line, taking every drop that flowed out of Colorado.97 
Unlike California, Kansas largely depends upon foreign sources for its water. 
It depends upon foreign places, the rivers that arise upstream in Colorado and 
Nebraska but contribute relatively small, highly variable surface water supplies. 
It also depends upon a foreign time, the geological past that produced the High 
Plains-Ogallala Aquifer. These groundwater supplies are substantial and 
dependable, but they are largely non-renewable. 
Kansas water law also used to resemble California’s, but that too has 
changed. Like California, Kansas adopted the English common law in the 1850s, 
recognized the prior appropriation doctrine soon thereafter, and developed a 
relatively uneventful legal regime combining the riparian and prior appropriation 
doctrines.98 Even the doctrines did not clash: Kansas has no epic cases such as 
Lux v. Haggin because it allocated the humid, eastern portion of the state to the 
former doctrine and the dry, High Plains portion to the latter. However, a series 
of legal setbacks in the 1940s exposed the obvious deficiencies of Kansas’s legal 
regime. Interstate litigation and federal water resources planning both put a 
premium on the state’s ability to quantify its water supplies, something difficult 
to achieve under the riparian doctrine.99 And in 1944, the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that the state’s water law was ineffectual regarding groundwater.100 
  
 
97.  JAMES SHEROW, WATERING THE VALLEY: DEVELOPMENT ALONG THE HIGH PLAINS ARKANSAS 
RIVER, 1870–1950, at 79–92 (1991). 
98.  Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in the Age of Permanent Depletion, 62 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1263, 1273–79 (2014). 
99.  Id. at 1278. 
100.  State ex rel. Peterson Co. v. Bd. of Agric., 149 P.2d 604, 607–09 (Kan. 1944). 
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A. The Founding Principles of Kansas Water Law 
In response to these challenges, Kansas enacted the Kansas Water 
Appropriation Act of 1945 (“KWAA”), comprehensively rewriting the state’s 
water law.101 The framers of the KWAA studied the water laws of all the western 
states, and the California experience informed their work.102 The KWAA 
codified the doctrine of prior appropriation statewide for all of the state’s water 
supplies, including groundwater.103 The KWAA established a permit requirement 
for all non-domestic rights and provided a statutory procedure by which pre-1945 
rights were recognized and permitted as vested rights.104 It placed jurisdiction 
over all of the state’s waters and water supplies under the Chief Engineer of the 
state’s division of water resources (“KDA-DWR”), a subordinate division of the 
Kansas Department of Agriculture.105 It expressly forbids the acquisition of water 
rights by adverse possession or use, thus foreclosing the possibility of 
prescriptive rights.106 
Compared to the wobbly tripod of California groundwater law, the KWAA 
appears to enjoy a much more stable design. The doctrinal leg consists of just one 
segment, that of prior appropriation; it repudiated the riparian doctrine and leaves 
no room for any other. Same for the jurisdictional leg: all the waters of the state 
fall under the chief engineer’s jurisdiction and not that of any local agency. 
Finally, the KWAA mandates reasonable use and prohibits waste, rendering 
unnecessary any constitutional provision to that effect. 
B. The Principles, Compromised 
Yet Kansas groundwater law soon developed destabilizing flaws. The 
principal doctrinal flaw was latent in the application of the prior appropriation 
doctrine to the vast but non-renewable supplies of the High Plains-Ogallala 
Aquifer. The original version of the KWAA required the Chief Engineer of 
KDA-DWR to put water to beneficial use by granting water rights, provided the 
water was available and its use did not impair existing rights; this is a standard 
duty under the prior appropriation doctrine.107 But the Ogallala posed a problem 
for the doctrine in its pure form. During the 1950s, the Ogallala’s largely 
 
101.  Kansas Water Appropriation Act of 1945, ch. 390, § 1 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to 
82a-745, 42-303, 42-313 (2020)); see generally John C. Peck, The Kansas Water Appropriation Act: A Fifty-
Year Retrospective, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 735, 736 (1995). 
102.  Griggs, supra note 96, at 1276–79. 
103.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-702, 82a-706, 82a-721 (2020). 
104.  Id. §§ 82a-705, 82a-709, 82a-704a, 82a-704b. 
105.  Id. §§ 82a-702, 82a-706. 
106.  Id. § 82a-705. 
107.  Kansas Water Appropriation Act of 1945, ch. 390, § 1 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to 
82a-745, 42-303, 42-313 (2020)). The Kansas rule was essentially the same as those of other prior appropriation 
jurisdictions with permit requirements, such as Wyoming. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-503 (2020). 
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undeveloped water supplies were available for beneficial use well in excess of 
the needs of existing rights; but any development of the aquifer would 
necessarily lower groundwater levels, impairing existing rights under the 1945 
standard. To enable the development of the aquifer, Kansas softened the 
impairment standard for granting new water rights in 1957 by defining it as 
impairment “beyond a reasonable economic limit.”108 Henceforth, KDA-DWR 
could grant junior rights whose use lowered groundwater levels. Holders of 
senior rights to the Ogallala retained their ability to protect their rights in times of 
shortage: the statutory sections for the administration of rights were left intact.109 
This redefinition of impairment for granting new rights, together with KDA-
DWR’s liberal policy of granting new Ogallala rights without regard to the 
aquifer’s long-term water supply, soon produced a regional problem of severe 
over-appropriation.110 KDA-DWR pursued the practice of granting new Ogallala 
rights according to the net irrigation requirement (“NIR”) of the appurtenant 
land.111 By the late 1970s, Kansas had, at least in some regards, effectively 
replaced the prior appropriation doctrine with something practically similar to the 
correlative rights doctrine.112 Landowners obtained the legal right to pump the 
NIR of their crops, a regulatory approximation of a “just and fair” proportion of 
the underlying groundwater supply.113 And corn, not wheat, became the default 
crop.114 Irrigators with senior rights did not bring impairment complaints, and 
they had their reasons. There was still enough water, and many who held senior 
rights also held junior ones.115 This doctrinal revolution went largely unnoticed, 
probably because it was incomplete: prior appropriators could still protect their 
rights. 
The jurisdictional realities of Kansas water law soon underwent a significant 
evolution as well. The Kansas Groundwater Management District Act 
(“KGMDA”) was enacted in 1972.116 Soon after its enactment, five groundwater 
management districts (“GMDs”) were established during the 1970s. Collectively, 
the GMDs cover almost all of the ground overlying the High Plains-Ogallala in 
 
108.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-711 (Kan. L. 1957, ch. 539, § 16) (1957). For more on the 1957 
amendments to the KWAA, see Peck, supra note 99, and Griggs, supra note 96. 
109.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-716, 82a-717a (2020); for an exemplary discussion, see Garetson Bros. v. 
American Warrior, Inc., 51 Kan. App. 2d 370, 380–82 (2015). 
110.  Griggs supra note 96, at 1285; John C. Peck, Groundwater Management in Kansas: A Brief History 
and Assessment, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 443 (2006). 
111.  Griggs, supra note 96, at 1285. 
112.  Id. at 1305; A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric? 76 N.D. L. REV. 
881, 900–01 (2000). 
113.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-5-12 (2020) (net irrigation requirements by county). 
114.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-24-2(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
115.  Griggs, supra note 96, at 1298–1304. 
116.  Act of Mar. 17, 1972, ch. 386, § 1–16, 1972 Kan. Sess. Laws 1416–30 (codified at KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 82a-1020 to 82-1035) (amended 1978); see John C. Peck, Kansas Groundwater Management Districts, 
29 U. KAN. L. REV. 51 (1980). 
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Kansas. GMDs have the authority to tax, to purchase and sell real property 
(including water rights), and to draft regulations for water use within their 
respective districts.117 If approved by the Chief Engineer, these regulations 
become binding and enforceable by the Chief Engineer; the GMDs have no 
independent administrative or legal authority.118 However, because they 
encompass most of the irrigation in Kansas, the GMDs have become the state’s 
most powerful water-related interest group. 
By the late 1970s, the depletion of the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer had 
become all too apparent in Kansas. Local irrigation interests took the initiative to 
amend the KGMDA in 1978, providing for the establishment of Intensive 
Groundwater Use Control Areas (“IGUCAs”).119 Based generally on similar 
legislation in Oregon, the IGUCA statutes enable the Chief Engineer (either on 
his own initiative, on the recommendation of a GMD, or by the submission of a 
petition of 5% of the water rights owners within a GMD) to conduct hearings to 
consider whether a particular area is suffering from excessive declines in surface 
flows or of groundwater levels, from a decline in water quality, or from a 
situation where groundwater withdrawals exceed recharge.120 If the Chief 
Engineer makes such a finding, he then conducts a second hearing to consider 
whether and how to impose appropriate “corrective control provisions” that will 
remedy the situation—most importantly, whether to impose reductions in 
pumping.121 After this second hearing, the Chief Engineer orders the 
establishment of an IGUCA for the area under consideration and imposes the 
corrective control provisions.122 These provisions do not require the 
administration of junior rights by strict priority; the Chief Engineer enjoys 
regulatory leeway in this regard.123 
Since 1978, the Chief Engineer has established eight IGUCAs in Kansas—
most of them to protect surface flows from impairment caused by excessive 
groundwater pumping.124 The most contentious IGUCA to date was undertaken 
to protect the surface rights of the Cheyenne Bottoms State Wildlife Area, an 
important refuge for migratory birds that depends on the flows of Walnut Creek 
in west-central Kansas.125 In the Walnut Creek IGUCA (1992), the Chief 
 
117.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1028 (2020). 
118.  Id. § 82a-1028(o). 
119.  Leland E. Rolfs, Comparing and Contrasting the Roles of the Division of Water Resources and the 
Groundwater Management Districts in Groundwater Management and Regulation, 15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
505, 509–10 (2006). 
120.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-1036, 82a-1037. 
121.  Id. § 82a-1038(a)–(b). 
122.  Id. § 82a-1038(b). 
123.  Id. § 82a-1038(c). 
124.  See Intensive Groundwater Use Control Areas (IGUCAs), KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 
DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES, https://agriculture.ks.gov/divisions-programs/dwr/managing-kansas-water-
resources/intensive-groundwater-use-control-areas (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) (on file with the University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
125.  See John C. Peck, Property Rights in Groundwater—Some Lessons from the Kansas Experience, 12 
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Engineer established a safe yield for the Walnut Creek Basin and ordered 
pumping reductions to achieve that yield. The reduction order did not follow the 
strict priorities of the rights which were impairing the wildlife area’s senior 
surface right; rather, it reduced groundwater use according to three tranches of 
priority.126 Vested, or pre-1945 rights, suffered no reductions. Rights with 
priorities between 1945 and 1965 suffered reductions—between 22% and 33%. 
Rights junior to 1965 suffered much higher reductions—between 64% and 
71%.127 The Walnut Creek IGUCA restored some degree of safe yield to an over-
drafted groundwater basin; Professor John C. Peck has compared the result to the 
Pasadena adjudication in this regard.128 
But the Chief Engineer has imposed no IGUCAs over the High Plains-
Ogallala Aquifer. He has not taken the initiative to do so himself, nor has any 
GMD or the members of any GMD. More broadly, the Chief Engineer has almost 
entirely avoided administering water rights according to priority over the non-
renewable Ogallala. As a group, Kansas water rights owners have almost entirely 
avoided requesting the usual tools in a water-short situation—priority 
administration, impairment investigations, and water rights adjudications.129 
Largely as a consequence, depletion rates across the High Plains-Ogallala 
Aquifer have continued and even accelerated. 
C. Reasons for Owners’ Lack of Initiative and State Regulatory Inaction 
Given that Kansas water law has long-established property rules and 
management tools that can reduce groundwater depletions, why have the KDA-
DWR or Kansas water rights owners not deployed them? The first answer is 
over-appropriation.130 Because most of the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer is 
effectively not replenishable (with typical recharge in the 1% to 3% 
neighborhood), that over-appropriation is only becoming worse, especially as 
corn and soybean hybrids, together with improved irrigation technology, allow 
full irrigation in areas previously considered non-irrigable. As a result, even if 
 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 499 (2003) (recounting the Walnut Creek IGUCA’s origin). 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. 
128.  Id. at 505. Peck correctly notes that the comparison is a rough one, since the KWAA expressly 
prohibits prescriptive rights (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-705). 
129.  But see Garetson Bros. v. American Warrior, Inc., 51 Kan. App. 2d 370 (2015) (enjoining a junior 
groundwater right that KDA-DWR had found to be impairing a senior right. 51 Kan. App.2d 370 (2015). The 
injunction was subsequently made permanent. Garetson Bros. v. American Warrior, Inc., 56 Kan. App. 2d 623 
(2019). Notably, plaintiffs brought their impairment case directly to the district court; they did not pursue the 
administrative remedy set forth in the KWAA. Such an independent defense of property rights alarmed the 
Kansas Legislature, which promptly amended the procedural statutes related to impairment, henceforth 
requiring all impairment claims to be filed with the Chief Engineer as a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief. 
Kan. Laws 2017, ch. 55, §§ 1–2 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-716, 82a-717a). 
130.  See supra text accompanying note 108. 
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every Kansas water right owner is acting within their legal rights (and nearly all 
water rights owners do comply with the limitations of their permits), then these 
depletions will continue to get worse. 
The second answer has to do with the essentially reactive function of the 
office of the Chief Engineer when it comes to water rights administration. The 
KWAA requires him to protect water rights, but typically only when owners 
request them to be protected.131 Because Kansas water rights owners are largely 
complying with the law by staying within the annual authorized quantities of 
their water rights, and because irrigators have decided (both individually and 
collectively) to not request the Chief Engineer to step in and order reductions, he 
is loath to take independent action. Ordering reductions in pumping might 
constitute an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution (along with parallel and stronger provisions under the Kansas 
Constitution).132 The likelihood of such a finding is probably small,133 but the 
political specter of takings haunts the minds of Kansas regulators. And while the 
Chief Engineer has the statutory duty to protect water rights when their owners 
request it, he does not have the duty to save the aquifer. Strong political interests, 
especially the large irrigators who dominate the membership and policy of the 
GMDs, have made clear that they would retaliate politically in the event of such 
a positive direction by the Chief Engineer. The office is structurally 
compromised in this regard: no other state water engineer in the West answers to 
a secretary of agriculture, who in turn accommodates the agriculture industry.134 
Finally, Kansas groundwater irrigators have not used these rules and tools 
because they strike them as too powerful and unpredictable.135 Under Kansas’s 
prior appropriation regime, an impairment investigation can lead to the 
administration of junior rights and the reduction of junior groundwater pumping. 
But very few irrigators have filed impairment complaints because priority 
administration in a groundwater context can have far-reaching effects.136 In a 
“neighborhood” of groundwater rights, protecting one right can mean 
administering as many as a dozen nearby rights, where the Chief Engineer finds 
that their cones of depression intrude upon the senior right.137 This creates an all-
or-nothing situation that makes irrigators hesitant to file an impairment 
complaint. Moreover, many holders of senior groundwater rights hold junior 
 
131.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-706b (2020); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-4-1, 5-4-1a (2020). 
132.  Peck, supra note 123 at 504–06. 
133.  Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 254 (2013). 
134.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-506b, 82a-1901 (2020). The secretary of agriculture, who holds her or his 
appointment from the Governor, repeatedly overruled water rights administration decisions made by the chief 
engineer to protect the senior surface rights held by the Quivira National Wildlife Refuge. The outlawry has 
prompted litigation. Audubon of Kan., Inc., v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, No. 2:21-CV-02025, 2021 WL 151768 
(D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2021). 
135.  Griggs, supra note 96, at 1291. 
136.  Id. at 1299–1300, 1300 (“sixteen impairment complaints out of nearly 40,000 groundwater rights? 
That is not a tragedy; it seems more like a farce.”). 
137.  See supra note 127. 
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rights as well, and so protecting the former might require shutting off the 
latter.138 As we will see below in Part III of this Article, groundwater irrigators in 
Kansas tend to disfavor the severe logic of prior appropriation, and usually prefer 
that a reduction in groundwater pumping be leveled against all rights equally 
rather than according to priority. 
The same concern largely explains why irrigators have not requested an 
IGUCA over the Ogallala. They fear that the public hearing process, which 
allows anyone to provide testimony, might place facts and expert opinion into the 
record that argue for corrective control provisions far in excess of what they 
might deem to be acceptable reductions in water use. An order that emerges from 
the IGUCA process may very well be too severe for the very irrigators who 
requested pumping reductions in the first place.139 
D. Predictable Self-Regulation: Local Enhanced Management Areas 
How, then, to remedy a situation where irrigators are leery of deploying the 
legal tools to protect their water rights and extend the practical life of the High 
Plains-Ogallala Aquifer? Irrigators and KDA-DWR recognized two needs. There 
is a need for local water users to generate their own plans for reducing 
groundwater depletions. The landscape of groundwater management across the 
Great Plains is littered with centrally imposed water conservation plans that 
irrigators have rejected for being excessive in their reductions and politically 
unpalatable for their lack of sensitivity to the concept of “local control.”140 There 
is also the need for the water reduction plans to be hydrologically meaningful and 
legally enforceable. 
During 2010 and 2011, there emerged a critical mass of groundwater 
irrigators, mostly in Northwest Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 4, 
who were willing to commit to a significant reduction in their water usage. But 
these irrigators were unwilling to trust the IGUCA process due to its potential 
unpredictability. In response, legislation enacted in 2012 provides for the 
establishment of Local Enhanced Management Areas, or LEMAs.141 
The LEMA statute follows the main steps of the IGUCA statutes but with 
some important procedural protections for irrigators who are interested in long-
term groundwater conservation. Under the statute, the GMD can submit a local 
 
138.  Indeed, this was one of the reasons why the Walnut Creek IGUCA (see supra text accompanying 
notes 123–26) did not provoke a sustained judicial challenge: holders of pre-1965 rights, which suffered 
comparatively smaller reductions, also held many post-1965 rights, which suffered comparatively greater 
reductions. A judicial resolution imposing strict priority administration according to the KWAA might have 
well imposed greater reductions in overall pumping. 
139.  Griggs, supra note 96, at 1291. 
140.  Id. at 1311; Peck, supra note 123, at 505–06. 
141.  2012 Kan. Sess. Laws 382 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041 (2020)). 
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enhanced management plan to the Chief Engineer for review.142 Such a plan may 
include proposed reductions in water use, methods to improve the temporal 
flexibility of water use, and means by which to transfer water between water 
rights holders. At this review stage, the Chief Engineer evaluates the plan to 
determine whether it is acceptable for consideration; after review, he 
communicates with the GMD to recommend changes, express his reservations, 
and provide other feedback. Where KDA-DWR has determined that a LEMA 
proposal is deficient, the Chief Engineer has returned the plan to the GMD for 
revisions.143 
After this review period, if the Chief Engineer decides that the local 
enhanced management plan is sound, he initiates proceedings for the 
establishment of a LEMA.144 These proceedings consist of at least two hearings. 
At the first hearing, the Chief Engineer appoints a hearing officer to consider, 
among other things, whether the area in question is suffering from excessive 
declines in surface flows of groundwater levels, from a decline in water quality, 
or from a situation where groundwater withdrawals exceed recharge.145 If the 
hearing officer finds that any such conditions exist, then the Chief Engineer sets a 
second public hearing to consider the merits of the LEMA plan and whether it 
should be adopted.146 
At the second public hearing (or hearings), there is an important difference 
from the IGUCA process: the scope of the hearing is limited to the plan put up by 
the sponsoring GMD.147 The Chief Engineer is thus statutorily prohibited from 
considering alternative LEMA plans. The plan in question may not be 
substantively amended, limiting uncertainty and potential changes offered by 
outside parties or the state. The only question before the Chief Engineer at this 
stage is whether to accept the proposed plan. Based on the evidence submitted at 
the hearings, the Chief Engineer can accept the plan as proposed, reject it, send it 
back to the GMD for revisions and resubmission; if he decides that it passes 
muster, then he issues an order of designation setting forth the local enhanced 
management plan in detail.148 As an order of the Chief Engineer, enforcement of 
the plan falls to KDA-DWR, and not to the GMD, thus taking the onus of 
enforcement off of the local groundwater interests who (somewhat paradoxically) 
 
142.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a) (2020). 
143.  See, e.g., Letter from David W. Barfield, Chief Engineer, Division of Water Resources, to Darrell 
Wood, President, Big Bend Groundwater Management District No. 5 (July 30, 2019) (responding to the KDA-
DWR’s response to the 2019 LEMA proposal made by the Big Bend Groundwater Management District No. 5), 
https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriation-documents/2019-07-
30formalresponsetofeb2019lema_request.pdf?sfvrsn=e5d688c1_0 (on file with the University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
144.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a). 
145.  Id. §§ 82a-1041(b), 82a-1036. 
146.  Id. § 82a-1041(e). 
147.  Id. § 82a-1041(c). 
148.  Id. §§ 82a-1041(d)–(f). 
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championed “local control” in the first place.149 The order is subject to both 
administrative and judicial review under Kansas administrative law.150 
In short, the LEMA statute combines local control over the groundwater 
management plan with the central enforcement authority held by KDA-DWR 
over the administration of water rights and IGUCAs. As we will see in Part III of 
this Article, this combination has produced meaningful groundwater conservation 
across western Kansas. 
IV. LEMAS IN KANSAS 
Since 2013, the Chief Engineer has approved three LEMAs. The LEMA 
concept has attracted national attention as a means to achieve meaningful 
groundwater conservation without running afoul of the legal protections afforded 
to the western groundwater right.151 Section A of this Part distills the three 
approved LEMA plans into eight principal features. Section B surveys the most 
notable legal, economic, and hydrological findings based on analyses of the 
LEMAs so far. 
A. A Distillation of the Relevant LEMA Features 
The three LEMAS are located in northwest and western Kansas. In 2012, 
Northwest Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 4 (“GMD4”) 
submitted the first LEMA plan to KDA-DWR for the Sheridan-6 “High Priority 
Area,” a designation for areas facing severe groundwater declines. The Chief 
Engineer approved the Sheridan-6 LEMA in 2013; it consists of ninety-nine 
sections across six townships in Sheridan and Thomas Counties.152 The Sheridan-
6 LEMA was renewed in 2017 for another five-year period, and its management 
programs are almost identical to its predecessor.153 The success of the Sheridan-6 
LEMA led to GMD4 securing the Chief Engineer’s approval of a second one, 
 
149.  Id. §§ 82a-1041(h), 82a-1901. However, the Chief Engineer may delegate enforcement authority to 
the GMD. Id. § 82a-1041(f). 
150.  Id. 
151.  See, e.g., Sip It Slowly: Farmers in Kansas Are Starting to Adapt to Declining Stocks of 
Groundwater, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21586874-
farmers-kansas-are-starting-adapt-declining-stocks-groundwater-sip-it-slowly (on file with the University of the 
Pacific Law Review); Laura Parker, What Happens to the U.S. Midwest When the Water’s Gone?, NATIONAL 
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 2016), http://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/08/vanishing-midwest-ogallala-
aquifer-drought/. 
152.  Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Mgmt. Area, 12-Water-8366, at 24–25, 28–29 (2013) (Order of 
Designation Approving the Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Management Area within Groundwater Management 
District No. 4) [hereinafter 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA]. The author represented the Chief Engineer in this 
matter. 
153.  Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Mgmt. Area in Sheridan and Thomas Ctys., Kan., 001-DWR-LEMA-
2017, at 5 (2017) (Order of Designation Regarding the Sheridan 6 Local Enhanced Management Plan for 2018-
2022) [hereinafter 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA]. 
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across the entire district, in 2018; it comprises ninety-five townships across the 
ten counties included within the district’s boundaries.154 And late in 2020, 
Western Kansas Groundwater Management District No. 1 (“GMD1”) secured the 
Chief Engineer’s approval of a LEMA for the sixteen townships of Wichita 
County that are within the boundaries of GMD1.155 An earlier effort by GMD1 to 
establish a district-wide LEMA failed by a narrow vote within the GMD, and did 
not proceed to the hearing stage. 
A review of the groundwater management plans approved for these three 
LEMAs reveals eight relevant features, which for the most part are reasonably 
consistent. What follows is a distillation of these features. 
1. Pumping Goals During the LEMA Period 
Each of the plans begins with a goal establishing the maximum amount of 
total groundwater to be pumped within the LEMA during a five-year period. The 
2013 Sheridan-6 LEMA set a goal of restricting all non-domestic groundwater 
pumping to no more than 114,000 acre-feet for the five irrigation seasons 
between 2013 and 2017, a reduction designed to reduce pumping by 20% 
compared to historic pumping levels.156 Its 2017 successor increased that total to 
117,600 acre-feet for 2018–2022, because 3,600 acres that had been enrolled in 
federal conservation programs during the first Sheridan-6 LEMA period had 
come out of those programs and were irrigating again.157 The GMD4 District-
Wide LEMA of 2018 limits total groundwater withdrawals for all appropriation 
rights to 1.7 million acre-feet for the 2018–2022 LEMA period.158 As discussed 
below in subsection 5, this LEMA excludes vested or pre-1945 rights from 
regulation. The 2020 GMD1 LEMA sets a five-year limit on irrigation 
withdrawals of 246,883 acre-feet, a reduction designed to reduce pumping by 
15% compared to historic pumping levels.159 
All of the LEMAs established so far are temporary and share a five-year 
duration.160 There is no requirement in the LEMA statute for a LEMA to be 
 
154.  Groundwater Management District No. 4 District Wide Local Enhanced Mgmt. Area in Cheyenne, 
Decatur, Gove, Graham, Logan Rawlins, Sheridan, Sherman, Thomas, and Wallace Ctys., Kan., 002-DWR-
LEMA-2017, at 35–37 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA]. 
155.  Wichita County Local Enhanced Mgmt. Area in Wichita Cty., Kan., 001-DWR-LEMA-2020, 
Exhibit A, at 3 (2020) (Order of Decision Accepting the Management Plan for the Wichita County Local 
Enhanced Management Area) [hereinafter 2020 GMD1 LEMA]. 
156.  2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 25, 29. 
157.  2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 6–7. These programs include the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Agricultural Water Enhancement Program (AWEP), both sponsored 
by the Natural Resources Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
158.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 42. 
159.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 2. 
160.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 2; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 
151, at 43; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 29; 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 
150, at 8. 
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permanent, temporary, or of any particular duration. The statute requires that the 
local enhanced management plan be substantial, and KDA-DWR has accepted 
these five-year plans as meeting that threshold requirement.161 The irrigators who 
developed these plans did not want to commit to permanent reductions. Instead, 
as described in subsection 8 below, the plans share an expectation that if they are 
successful, then they should be renewed for a successive five-year period, as the 
Sheridan-6 LEMA has been. 
2. Prior Appropriation Rights 
The most important doctrinal aspect of the LEMA plans is that they almost 
completely disregard the priority system in setting individual pumping 
allocations. In both generations of the Sheridan-6 LEMA, all irrigation rights are 
reduced regardless of priority.162 The 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA and the 
2020 GMD1 LEMA reduce all appropriation rights (defined in the KWAA as 
post-1945 rights163) regardless of priority.164 But these two LEMAs have 
exceptions for vested rights, which the KWAA defines as pre-1945 rights 
subsequently recognized under its statutory procedures.165 This division into pre- 
and post-1945 rights is not as important as it first appears largely because few 
large groundwater irrigation rights were developed in western Kansas prior to the 
enactment of the KWAA. The issue of vested rights is discussed below in 
subsection 5. 
However, the LEMA plans do not disregard priority in protecting individual 
water rights. In times of water shortage, an owner is entitled to the protections of 
priority if the Chief Engineer determines that her right is being impaired by other 
rights.166 The LEMA plans expressly maintain that entitlement, but recommend 
to the Chief Engineer that he consider the requirements of the plan in resolving 
the impairment matter.167 These are sensible requests, because the Kansas 
regulations have distinct procedures for situations involving discrete well-to-well 
impairment168 and for those involving a regional decline in aquifer levels.169 The 
latter situation is the general motivation for the LEMAs in the first place. Thus, 
 
161.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(a) (2020). 
162.  2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 12; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 
149, at 29. 
163.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(e). 
164.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, at 4, and Exhibit A, at 3; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, 
supra note 151, at 43, and Attachment 1, 11. 
165.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701(d), 82a-704a. 
166.  KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-706b, 82a-707(c); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-4-1, 5-4-1a (2020). 
167.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 3, 9; 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra 
note 151, Exhibit 1, at 9; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 38–39. 
168.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-4-1. 
169.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-4-1a. 
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the 2013 Sheridan-6 LEMA expressly provides for a water right owner to bring a 
well-to-well impairment complaint; but if the Chief Engineer finds that the 
impairment is the result of a regional lowering of the water table, the LEMA plan 
gives the Chief Engineer latitude in determining the “appropriate resolution” of 
such impairment.170 
3. Practical and Flexible Allocations During the LEMA Period 
The LEMAs order the reduction of groundwater pumping according to 
several practical factors. The most prevalent factor is recent pumping levels, not 
the certified annual authorized quantity of the perfected water rights. Because of 
over-appropriation and aquifer-wide depletion, very few groundwater rights in 
western Kansas can pump the annual quantities and at the pumping rates 
described in their water rights certificates. The framers of the LEMAs recognized 
the obvious: meaningful reductions had to be based on recent pumping levels, not 
the “paper water” described in the water rights certificates. In the 2013 GMD4 
Sheridan-6 LEMA, all irrigation rights were limited to a five-year allocation of 
eleven inches annually—or fifty-five inches total—for each “designated eligible 
acre,” which is the appurtenant acreage for each water right actually irrigated in 
either 2010, or the highest acreage irrigated between 2007 and 2010.171 The 
allocation of each water right is individually quantified in the LEMA order.172 
The temporal flexibility of the allocations is a critical aspect of the LEMAs. 
An irrigator in the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA can use the fifty-five inches per 
designated eligible acre however he deems appropriate over the five-year period, 
provided he does not pump more than the right’s annual authorized quantity in 
any given year.173 The second-generation Sheridan-6 LEMA maintains this 
allocation method but rewards conservation by allowing a five inch per acre 
carryover for any unused allocation from the original’s 2013–2017 period.174 
The other two LEMAs follow this same temporal flexibility but take a 
different approach to their respective five-year allocations. In the 2018 GMD4 
District-Wide LEMA, pumping is limited according to the groundwater situation 
within the specific township. Annual pumping amounts range from 12.9 inches 
annually (for a five-year allocation of 64.5 inches) in the most-depleted 
townships, to up to 18 inches annually for a five-year allocation of 90 inches in 
the least-depleted ones.175 The latter figure, while enjoyed by senior rights in 
 
170.  2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 38–39. 
171.  Id. at 26, 29–30. 
172.  Id. 
173.  Id. at 32. 
174.  2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 6. 
175.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 43, and Attachment 1, at 11. The attentive 
reader has noticed that the 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA is wholly within the boundaries of the 2018 GMD4 
District-Wide LEMA. GMD4 was alert to this issue and has resolved it by requiring that the most restrictive 
allocation applies in the event of a conflict. 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 13. 
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western Kansas, is in excess of the current NIR for many of the counties in 
western Kansas, and so imposes little or no reductions in pumping.176 The 
baseline for the district-wide reductions is the maximum reported irrigated acres 
under the individual water right between 2009 and 2015.177 There is a detailed 
appeals process for challenging the determination of eligible acres.178 No water 
right is reduced more than 25% from the average historical pumping amounts of 
that seven-year period, unless it would allow more than eighteen inches per acre 
to be pumped.179 Like the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, the district-wide LEMA 
envisions its own renewal. In that case, the GMD4 board will consider allowing a 
10% carryover of the LEMA’s allocations for the successive LEMA period.180 
The 2020 GMD1 LEMA involves severely crippled groundwater rights, and 
its method of allocation reflects that dire reality.181 The five-year allocations 
apply to all irrigation rights and to all voluntarily-enrolled vested rights.182 The 
LEMA allocations require a 14.7% reduction in water use over the five-year 
period, compared to the “historical usage” of 2009–2015 pumping levels. This is 
less than the 20.02% reduction estimated by the Kansas Geological Survey to be 
required to stabilize groundwater levels for the next decade or two, but the 14.7% 
reduction will be sufficient to extend the practical usable lifetime of the aquifer at 
a saturated thickness of fifteen feet from seven to sixteen years.183 The LEMA 
applies the reduction to two classes of water rights. For the most crippled water 
rights, where the “historical usage” of 2009–2015 is 20% or less of the annual 
authorized quantity set forth in the individual water rights certificate, then the 
five-year allocation is simply five times the historical usage.184 No further 
reductions are required of this class of water right. For less severely crippled 
rights, where the historical usage is more than 20% of the rights’ annual 
authorized quantities, then the five-year allocation is the greater of the following 
amounts: 20% of the annual authorized quantity multiplied by five, or 75% of 
historical usage multiplied by five, a “conservation factor.”185 The 2020 GMD1 
LEMA also contains detailed procedures for appealing allocations.186 The 
irrigators within the 2020 GMD1 LEMA have struck a bargain with themselves, 
 
176.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-5-12 (2020). 
177.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 45. 
178.  Id. 45–46. 
179.  Id. at 44. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Most of the aquifer within Wichita County is below the minimum saturated thickness required to 
support well yields at 200 gallons per minute (gpm) under a 90-day pumping scenario with 200 gpm wells on 
quarter sections. 2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, Attachment F, at 20. The irrigation of corn in 
western Kansas generally requires a 400 gpm well pumping over a 100-day irrigation season. 
182.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 4–5. 
183.  Id. at 8–9. 
184.  Id. Exhibit A, at 4. 
185.  Id. Exhibit A, at 1, 4. 
186.  Id. Exhibit A, at 9–11. 
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playing for as much time as the aquifer will allow under moderate reductions in 
use. 
4. Flexibility of Water Usage Across Water Rights and Appurtenant Land 
The LEMAs also permit the combination of individual groundwater rights 
into one or more allocations, and allow water supplies from one right within such 
an allocation to be transferred to a different point of diversion or place of use. 
This is a significant deviation from the statutory and regulatory provisions of the 
KWAA, which would otherwise require changes in the underlying rights to be 
approved by application to the chief engineer on an individual basis and 
subjected to the no-injury rule.187 Both iterations of the GMD4 Sheridan-6 
LEMA allow individual rights to be combined into a single allocation. Multiple 
allocations can be combined into an irrigation allocation account, which can be 
apportioned across the individual, constituent water rights’ discrete points of 
diversion within that account—provided, of course, that the total allocation 
account and the annual authorized quantities of its individual constituent rights 
are not exceeded.188 Irrigation allocations can be transferred to a different place 
of use or point of diversion; in the event of such a transfer, GMD4 does the 
accounting work—not KDA-DWR.189 
The other two LEMAs have less flexible provisions for allocating multiple 
rights across points of diversion and places of use. In the 2018 GMD4 District-
Wide LEMA, wells pumping to a common irrigation system or systems receive a 
single allocation for the total acres irrigated by the system.190 The 2020 GMD1 
LEMA uses the term “combined well unit” to describe multiple rights diverting 
water from the same source of supply and physically tied together for the 
distribution of irrigation water. Wells within a combined well unit can share the 
combined quantity of their individual LEMA allocations, but again, no individual 
right can exceed its annual authorized quantity.191 All such units must be enrolled 
in the first year of the LEMA period (2021) and be approved by both the GMD1 
board and KDA-DWR prior to their implementation.192 
It should be noted, however, that the attributes of the groundwater rights 
underlying these allocations do not change. The allocations do not effect any 
permanent alteration of the underlying water rights.193 Changes to these “base 
 
187.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-708b (2020); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-5-1 to 5-5-16 (2020). 
188.  2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 9–10; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra 
note 149, at 30–31. 
189.  2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 31. 
190.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 43. Where the places of use for a common 
irrigation system span two zones with different pumping allocation levels, then the total allocation is based on a 
weighted average of allocations based on the irrigated acres in each zone. Id. 
191.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 1, 7. 
192.  Id. 
193.  Id. Exhibit A, at 4. 
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water rights” must be performed according to the standard KWAA statutes and 
regulations for evaluating applications to change water rights.194 Allocations can 
be increased or decreased by the purchase or sale of water rights.195 
5. Preferential Treatment of Vested and Non-irrigation Rights 
Irrigation use accounts for almost all water pumped across the LEMAs.196 
That has allowed the GMDs to include preferential treatments for smaller, non-
irrigation uses, reducing their allocations by lesser amounts or not reducing them 
at all. In both iterations of the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, stockwatering rights 
were reduced by 20% for their respective five-year allocations.197 Because 
irrigators sell much of their corn and grain sorghum to local feedlots, the 
preferential treatment for stockwatering rights makes sense. Recreational rights 
in the Sheridan-6 LEMA suffered only a 10% reduction in their annual 
authorized quantities for their five-year allocations.198 
The other two LEMAs treat vested rights and non-irrigation rights even more 
favorably. In the 2020 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, vested rights that draw from 
an alluvial water supply are exempt from reductions.199 Stockwatering uses are 
“encouraged” but not required to use 90% of their allowable use under the 
KWAA regulations.200 Municipal users are similarly “encouraged” but not 
required to reduce water use, and all other non-irrigation rights are urged to use 
best management practices.201 The 2020 GMD1 LEMA completely exempts 
vested rights from LEMA reductions; but vested rights may voluntarily enroll in 
the LEMA and thus partake of the temporal and spatial flexibility provided by 
the allocations. Once enrolled, however, vested rights may not be withdrawn 
during the five-year LEMA period.202 The 2020 GMD1 LEMA does not subject 
non-irrigation uses to reductions because those uses account for less than 4% of 
all water usage in the area.203 Stockwatering rights, municipal rights, industrial 
 
194.  See, e.g., 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 44. 
195.  2013 GDM4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 33–34 (for stockwatering rights). 
196.  For example, non-irrigation rights make up approximately 7.7% of all water rights in GMD4. 2018 
GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 34. 
197.  2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 10 (reducing the regulatory maximum 
reasonable quantity for livestock from 15 gallons per head per day as set forth in KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-3-22 
(2017) to 12 gallons per head per day in the LEMA); 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 33–34. 
198.  2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 11; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 
149, at 34. 
199.  2020 GDM1 LEMA, supra note 152 Exhibit A, at 2. 
200.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 44. Such a reduction would limit stock uses 
to 13.5 gallons per head per day, using the 15-gallon per head per day limit in KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-3-22 
(2020). 
201.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 44. 
202.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 2–3, 5. 
203.  Id. Exhibit A, at 3, 11. 
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rights, recreational rights, and domestic rights are instead encouraged to use 
water more efficiently and engage in voluntary conservation measures.204 
6. Enhanced Civil Penalties for Violations 
One of the most revealing characteristics of the LEMA orders is their 
enhanced civil penalty provisions: the irrigators who devised the LEMAs clearly 
want violators to pay a heightened price. Under the civil penalty provisions of the 
KWAA, the standard monetary penalty for over-pumping is $500 per day that 
over-pumping was occurring, with a maximum penalty period of twenty days and 
a maximum suspension of one year of water use.205 In cases of repeat offenses 
and substantial over-pumping violations, the Chief Engineer has discretion to 
impose more severe penalties up to $1,000 per day, reductions in future pumping 
equal to twice the amount of water over-pumped (but not to exceed the annual 
authorized quantity of the right), and up to five-year suspensions of the water 
right.206 However, the regulations contain numerous mitigating factors, such as 
the absence of gross negligence or intentional noncompliance, or the prompt 
correction of the violation upon KDA-DWR’s notification of the violation. These 
make such harsh penalties a rarity.207 
By contrast, the civil penalty provisions for most of the LEMAs are stiffer 
and leave no room for the Chief Engineer’s discretion. In the GMD4 Sheridan-6 
LEMA, exceeding the annual authorized quantity of any single water right shall 
result in a $1,000 fine, and exceeding any allocation quantity by less than four 
acre-feet during the five-year LEMA period shall result in a $1,000 fine for every 
day pumping was taking place in excess of the allocation.208 Any violation in 
excess of four acre-feet results in an automatic two-year suspension of the water 
right and to all rights in a combined allocation account—effectively putting the 
owner out of the irrigation business for two years.209 Other civil penalties are 
expressly made available under the KWAA.210 Finally, there is the locals’ duty to 
snitch: if GMD4 learns of any violation of the LEMA order, it has the express 
obligation to report the violation to KDA-DWR and to assist KDA-DWR.211 
These civil penalty provisions were renewed in the second generation of the 
Sheridan-6 LEMA.212 The 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA contains similar 
penalties and allows fines up to $10,000 for exceeding the allocation limits.213 
 
204.  Id. Exhibit A, at 6–7. 
205.  KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 5-14-10(e), 5-14-10(m) (2020). 
206.  Id. § 5-14-12(e). 
207.  Id. § 5-14-12(f). 
208.  2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, 37–38. 
209.  Id. at 38. 
210.  Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-737 (2013)). 
211.  Id. 
212.  2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 11. 
213.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 47. 
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The 2020 GMD1 LEMA is the only LEMA which does not impose a stricter civil 
penalty regime than that of the KWAA.214 
7. Monitoring, Water Use Reporting, and Meter Tampering Burdens 
The heightened civil penalty provisions of the LEMAs accompany increased 
groundwater monitoring, more extensive water use reporting requirements, and a 
significant change in the evidentiary burdens concerning insufficient meter 
information. They require additional monitoring wells, some of which are 
equipped with a continuous pressure transducer to enable hourly measurements. 
The GMDs operate and maintain these wells and cooperate with KDA-DWR in 
obtaining and analyzing the meter data.215 Irrigators in the GMD4 Sheridan-6 
LEMA as well as the 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA must report their water 
use more frequently, as often as every two weeks; these requirements are in 
addition to the annual water use requirements imposed by the KWAA.216 
A perhaps more telling feature is how the LEMAs deal with the possibility of 
meter tampering. In both the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA and the 2020 GMD1 
LEMAs, if either the GMD or KDA-DWR questions the meter readings, and the 
irrigator does not provide pumping records, then the water right shall be 
presumed to have diverted its full annual authorized quantity for the year in 
which the GMD requested the well record. Any issues regarding meter 
inaccuracy lead to the same presumption.217 The 2018 GMD4 District-Wide 
LEMA goes even further. If the GMD learns of any meter tampering or other 
meter-related dishonesty, then the GMD board shall recommend a five-year 
suspension of the water right, and further, that it be stripped of its remaining 
assigned allocation quantities.218 The change in the presumption means that 
neither KDA-DWR nor the GMD needs to prove that the records and meters 
under review have been doctored. Clearly, the irrigators want the strongest 
penalties possible for such violations.219 But because LEMAs are established by 
order of the Chief Engineer, only KDA-DWR has actual enforcement and civil 
penalty authority. Thus, the GMDs and KDA-DWR cooperate in water use 
accounting.220 
 
214.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 7. 
215.  2020 GMD1 LEMA, supra note 152, Exhibit A, at 7; 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 
150, at 11-12; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, at 39–40. 
216.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, 47–48; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra 
note 149, 34–35. 
217.  2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 149, 34–35. 
218.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 47. 
219.  At one meeting in Hoxie, Kansas, in 2011 in which the author was present in his professional 
capacity representing the Chief Engineer, irrigators proposed that pumping and metering violations of LEMA 
orders be classified as felonies, and wrongdoers punished accordingly—provided that they first receive a fair 
trial. Sadly, this proposal did not gain traction in the legislature. 
220.  2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA, supra note 151, at 49; 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra 
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8. Annual Reviews and Reviews for LEMA Renewals 
Finally, all of the LEMAs establish committees and procedures to review the 
operations of the individual LEMA, both on an annual basis and with the longer-
term goal of renewing the LEMA for a successive period. The committees 
consist of irrigators within each LEMA as well as representatives from KDA-
DWR.221 They conduct annual reviews and produce annual reports covering the 
following required subjects: water use data; groundwater level information; 
economic data; whether the allocations of individual rights have concentrated or 
distorted the geographic distribution of diversions and water use within the 
LEMA; violations and meter-data issues related to violations; enforcement 
issues; new and enhanced groundwater management options; and any 
recommended modifications to the existing LEMA order.222 The metering 
provisions of the LEMA orders are a specific subject of annual reviews; if the 
committee deems them to be ineffective, then it shall recommend changes to the 
Chief Engineer.223 
The most important review issue is probably that of whether to renew the 
LEMA for a successive period. Each of the LEMAs provide for such a formal 
review to be performed in the last year or eighteen months of the LEMA under 
review. The review covers the same subjects as those in the annual reviews but 
considers the overall impacts of the LEMA. The most important of these impacts 
are as follows: the economic impacts of the pumping reductions; changes in 
water levels and changes in their rate of decline; whether the increased flexibility 
afforded by the LEMA allocations substantially increased water use in the 
LEMA, or raised other concerns; and the impact of the LEMA on the “local 
public interest.”224 The ultimate matters of consideration are whether to extend 
the LEMA for another period, whether to expand the boundaries of the LEMA, 
and whether to consider any additional LEMA plans for the future.225 
B. Early Legal, Economic, and Hydrological Findings Concerning LEMAs 
Since the first LEMA was established in 2013, the LEMA approach to 
groundwater conservation has gained the attention of water experts working 
across several professional disciplines. Because all owners of non-domestic 
 
note 149, at 36–37. 
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Kansas water rights must report their annual diversion amounts and acreages, and 
because KDA-DWR and the Kansas Geological Survey operate an extensive 
statewide network of groundwater monitoring wells, Kansas enjoys an unusually 
rich record of water data. This data has enabled economists and scientists to 
reach confident conclusions about the specific impacts of LEMA-style 
groundwater management. 
But first, there are the legal issues: for a LEMA to exist, it must withstand 
legal challenges. Because the IGUCA and LEMA statutes allow the Chief 
Engineer to order reductions in groundwater pumping across groundwater rights 
within the subject area, the establishment of such areas has provoked some 
predictable but so far unsuccessful legal challenges.226 Neither generation of the 
Sheridan-6 LEMA was challenged, nor was the 2020 GMD1 LEMA.227 
However, a group of irrigators within GMD4 raised a substantial legal challenge 
to the 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA.228 While they lost their case and did 
not appeal, two aspects of their challenge—and KDA-DWR’s response—merit 
comment. 
One aspect concerns that of the prior appropriation doctrine. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the LEMA statute, as well as the establishment of the 2018 GMD4 
District-Wide LEMA, violated the KWAA by impermissibly deviating from the 
prior appropriation doctrine that the KWAA codifies. As set forth above, the 
LEMA statute does not require the corrective control provisions of a LEMA to be 
imposed upon groundwater rights according to strict priority; rather, it contains a 
precatory recommendation that priority be followed “insofar as may be 
reasonably done.”229 Based on the LEMA statute’s language, the district court 
easily disposed of the plaintiffs’ prior appropriation argument: “Had the 
Legislature meant for the prior appropriation doctrine to apply to LEMAs and 
IGUCAs then there would have been mention of it within the statute. Instead, the 
Legislature authorized the corrective controls that directly and unambiguously 
contravene the prior appropriation doctrine.”230 The district court similarly 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that the preferential treatment of non-irrigation 
uses violated the KWAA’s use-blind prior appropriation provisions. It found that 
such treatment was reasonable based on the fact that non-irrigation uses 
constituted a tiny fraction of overall water use in GMD4.231 
A second aspect concerns takings. The plaintiffs argued that the GMD4 
 
226.  For potential legal challenges to IGUCAs, see Peck, supra note 123, at 504–06. 
227.  See 2017 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA, supra note 150, at 5. 
228.  Friesen v. Barfield, No. 2018-CV-000010, (Gove Cty., Kan. Dist. Court Oct. 15, 2019). The 
decision is available at https://agriculture.ks.gov/docs/default-source/dwr-water-appropriation-
documents/friesen-memorandum-decision-101519.pdf?sfvrsn=7bfd89c1_0 (on file with the University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
229.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1041(f)(2) (2020). 
230.  Friesen, No. 2018-CV-000010, at 24. 
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District-Wide LEMA plan committed takings because it retroactively reduced 
vested groundwater rights and constituted a regulatory taking of both vested and 
appropriation rights.232 The district court rejected these arguments, based on the 
court’s characterization of the property rights under review and according to 
Kansas’s version of the Penn Central test.233 Because the LEMA plan was 
temporary, the underlying water rights subject to the five-year corrective control 
provisions had not been subject to an impermissible taking—apparently 
suggesting that only a permanent reduction would raise constitutional 
concerns.234 The court similarly emphasized that the “character of the 
governmental action” under Penn Central and its Kansas progeny was to 
promote the public “common good” of regional groundwater conservation.235 In 
fact, the court noted that the plaintiffs “may even gain an economic benefit from 
the reduced water usage” imposed by the LEMA.236 
These two aspects of the decision are not controversial. Yet KDA-DWR, for 
understandable reasons, has apparently developed a sensitivity to the plaintiffs’ 
legal arguments. In responding to the allegation that LEMAs might run afoul of 
the prior appropriation doctrine, the Chief Engineer has emphasized how the 
LEMA orders have upheld and maintained the doctrine by expressly allowing for 
senior rights to bring impairment actions against junior rights, and by noting that 
the “base water rights”—and their attendant priorities—remain unaffected by 
LEMA allocations. That includes impairment actions brought against junior uses 
that are subject to smaller reductions in their allocations because their economic 
value is greater than that of irrigation use.237 
Next, the plaintiffs’ takings arguments may help explain why all of the 
LEMA orders establish temporary, five-year management plans, as the GMDs 
intended. Reductions in water use dictated by the prior appropriation doctrine 
raise no takings issues: an express condition of a prior appropriation right is its 
priority, which entitles the owner to divert water when it is available in excess of 
prior rights.238 But LEMA plans apply their pumping reductions without regard 
to priority, leaving that classic takings defense unavailable.239 This largely 
explains why, but also how, KDA-DWR has stressed that takings fears are 
“unfounded”: because the five-year allocations do not permanently change the 
underlying water rights, they do not limit the amount of water that can be 
 
232.  Id. at 16–17. 
233.  Frick v. City of Salina, 290 Kan. 869 (2010). 
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accompanying notes 163–67. 
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pumped in any single year (within the annual authorized quantity of the right), 
and they will be evaluated at the end of the five-year period to determine whether 
they should be continued.240 
Moving from law to economics, early findings show that the LEMAs have 
allowed groundwater irrigators to achieve substantial reductions in groundwater 
pumping without suffering substantial decreases in their revenue. A five-year 
study commissioned to evaluate the economic impacts of the first-generation 
GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA produced promising results.241 It compared water 
usage, cropping practices, and economic outcomes for the LEMA with nearby 
irrigated acreage outside the LEMA’s boundaries. Irrigators within the Sheridan-
6 LEMA reduced their total groundwater use by over 23%, reduced their average 
groundwater use per acre by 16%, and reduced their irrigated crop acreage by 
10.9%.242 Economic data supplied by the irrigators “suggests that producers 
within the LEMA boundary have been able to reduce groundwater use with 
minimal impact on cash flow.”243 These findings are consistent with an earlier 
study of the Walnut Creek IGUCA, which found that irrigators were able to 
mitigate their initial losses by growing higher-value crops and improving their 
water-use efficiencies.244 The Sheridan-6 LEMA study’s interim findings played 
an important role in the renewal of the LEMA in 2017.245 One of the renewal 
order’s findings of fact noted that the first-generation LEMA was “effective,” 
producing a significant decrease in the rate of decline of the aquifer, and thus 
extending its practical life but without causing a significant decrease in 
profitability to irrigators.246 Moreover, it should be noted that neither the Walnut 
Creek IGUCA study nor the Sheridan-6 LEMA study evaluated an important 
factor: how the conservation of groundwater supplies has protected the value of 
the irrigated land. 
Most importantly, there is the groundwater supply itself. Hydrological 
analyses of the Sheridan-6 LEMA have revealed the conservation potential of 
LEMAs. Hydrogeologists studying the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA since 2013 
have produced several research articles using pumping and water-level data to 
assess the impact of its required pumping reductions. In the first study, factoring 
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in the impact of climatic conditions on pumping, they found that the average 
annual groundwater pumping in the LEMA has been reduced by about 29%, and 
the rate of water-level decline by about 67%.247 The study also found that 
“practically feasible” reductions of 10%–20% can have a larger impact on water-
level decline rates than was previously known. Larger reductions of 20%–30% 
would stabilize water levels in that area of northwest Kansas for the next decade 
or two.248 This work shows that modest reductions in annual pumping can have a 
large impact on rates of groundwater decline, extending by more than a 
proportionate amount the duration of a typical HPA water right thanks to long-
term recharge from irrigation return flows that have previously gone 
unrecognized.249 
A second, 2019 study of the Sheridan-6 LEMA made similarly promising 
conclusions. It found that the LEMA surpassed its stated goals for reduced water 
use, conserving enough water within the local aquifer to provide over 1.4 years’ 
worth of historic water needs. Yet irrigators made only minor adjustments to total 
irrigated acres to meet the mandated pumping reductions; instead, they employed 
more efficient water management and grew less water-intensive crops.250 
Moreover, farmers were apparently able to maintain their pre-LEMA net profit 
levels, despite lower yields due to reduced input and energy costs.251 A 2020 
study largely reaffirms these results.252 
V. HIGH PLAINS LESSONS FOR THE CENTRAL VALLEY 
A. The Appropriateness of the Comparison 
What can California learn from the Kansas LEMA experience so far? Having 
reviewed the states’ distinct legal regimes for groundwater in Part II, and having 
dissected the LEMA plans in Part III, the differences but especially the 
similarities between the two states become more visible. 
Obviously, there are distinct differences in hydrology, doctrine, and 
jurisdiction. SGMA requires the sustainability that it defines, while the LEMAs 
the Kansas Chief Engineer has so far approved are limited to non-renewable, 
substantially depleted portions of the High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer. Unlike 
 
247.  James J. Butler, Jr., Donald O. Whittemore, B. Brownie Wilson & Geoffrey C. Bohling, 
Sustainability of Aquifers Supporting Irrigated Agriculture: A Case Study of the High Plains Aquifer in Kansas, 
43 WATER INT’L 815, 818–21 (2018). 
248.  Id. at 825. 
249.  Id. at 819–25. 
250.  Jillian M. Deines, Anthony D. Kendall, James J. Butler & David W. Hyndman, Quantifying 
Irrigation Adaptation Strategies in Response to Stakeholder-Driven Groundwater Management in the US High 
Plains Aquifer, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Apr. 2019. 
251.  Id. at 9. 
252.  J. J. Butler Jr., G.C. Bohling, D. O. Whittemore & B. B. Wilson, Charting Pathways Toward 
Sustainability for Aquifers Supporting Irrigated Agriculture, 56 WATER RESOURCES RES., OCT. 2020. 
2021 / High Plains Lessons for California’s Sustainable Groundwater 
Management Act 
534 
California, LEMAs exist within a prior appropriation system in which senior 
rights holders can bring impairment actions according to that doctrine, and the 
LEMA plans explicitly allow for such actions. And unlike SGMA mandates, 
Kansas LEMAs are voluntary initiatives. 
But these distinctions are not disqualifying; indeed, the similarities between 
the states’ groundwater situations are ultimately more compelling. First, the 
LEMA management tool also applies to renewable groundwater basins where 
sustainable management is possible—and where sustainable management will 
likely be required. The most pressing example is in west-central Kansas, where 
groundwater pumping has impaired the senior surface-water rights of the Quivira 
National Wildlife Refuge, a wetland of international importance. Big Bend 
Groundwater Management District No. 5 (GMD5) has proposed several 
iterations of a LEMA, none of which have yet to secure the approval of the Chief 
Engineer.253 Federal law clearly mandates the sustainable management of water 
supplies upon which national wildlife refuges depend, in statutory and regulatory 
terms far less compromising than the lawyerly definitions found in SGMA.254 
The Walnut Creek IGUCA, whose substantive statutory tools are identical to 
those of a LEMA, was established to restore a groundwater basin to at least some 
degree of sustainable management.255 The showdown at Quivira will likely create 
a situation quite similar to SGMA. Pumpers will likely pursue a LEMA plan 
establishing proportional pumping levels to save them from the draconian 
application of the prior appropriation doctrine; and federal law will likely require 
that plan to achieve sustainability. 
Moreover, neither SGMA nor the Kansas LEMAs insist upon strict 
adherence to rigid water law doctrine. As described in Part II, California’s 
groundwater experience has embraced a multitude of doctrinal approaches. Since 
Katz, California’s doctrine of correlative rights has recognized proportional rights 
for overlying landowners; however, it has also recognized both appropriative and 
prescriptive rights for off-tract users.256 Overlying landowners have long been 
able to pursue an impairment action against the unreasonable and inequitable 
pumping of their neighbors, pursuant to Katz and its progeny; they just cannot 
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254.  See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2020) 
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sustainability in the SGMA, see supra text accompanying notes 75–76. 
255.  See supra text accompanying notes 123–25, 145–46. 
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pursue the action under the prior appropriation doctrine.257 California’s 
groundwater adjudications have produced a wide spectrum of doctrinal 
approaches to groundwater allocation.258 SGMA recognizes this relatively irenic 
embrace by avoiding any commentary on or commitment to property rights in 
groundwater.259 In Kansas, the IGUCA and LEMA statutes substantially 
compromise the prior appropriation doctrine, allowing for the same pumping 
reductions across hundreds of groundwater rights with discrete priorities.260 
Priority of right is simply not a management priority in these areas. Local 
irrigators could have made it so, but they have not. Likewise, the LEMA plans 
contain prominent use preferences, privileging the type of use made of water 
over the water right’s temporal priority.261 
Finally, there are clean parallels between the states’ procedural approaches. 
The California GSA operates much as a Kansas GMD does: it authors a GSP, as 
the Kansas GMD authors a LEMA plan. The state reviews the local plan: in 
California, DWR and the SWRCB review the local GSA’s GSP; and in Kansas, 
the Chief Engineer of KDA-DWR reviews the LEMA plan. Where the state finds 
the local plan to be deficient, it returns the plan to the local agency for 
reformation and improvement. 
On balance then, the comparison between groundwater conservation plans 
under SGMA and those under Kansas law is more than an academic exercise. 
That comparison yields three useful lessons. 
B. Lesson One: Beware of Bluewashing 
The first lesson is to beware of “bluewashing”—the tendency to portray 
water conservation plans as hydrologically meaningful, when in fact they are 
not.262 
Part III revealed significant differences in the pumping reductions required 
by the three LEMA plans: the Kansas Chief Engineer has approved strong plans, 
but he has also approved weak, bluewashing plans. Both generations of the 
Sheridan-6 LEMA plan are strong plans: they have reduced groundwater 
pumping by approximately 29%, thereby substantially reducing the rate of water-
decline level by about 67%.263 The other plans are weak by comparison. Large 
areas of the 2018 GMD4 District-Wide LEMA are subject to little or no pumping 
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reductions, belying its claim to be “district-wide.”264 The 2020 GMD1 LEMA 
claims the ambition of a 14.7% reduction in pumping, but actual reductions will 
probably be significantly smaller than that figure.265 The most crippled rights 
suffer no reductions at all, and the GMD1 appeals process appears to allow 
irrigators the option of reclassifying their water rights for the lower level of 
groundwater reductions.266 Nonetheless, the Chief Engineer has approved these 
weak plans, apparently because they meet very modest five-year goals.267 
Yet the Chief Engineer has also denied weak plans. Since 2017, KDA-DWR 
has consistently rejected successive iterations of a LEMA plan put forth by 
GMD5 to address the impairment of the senior surface water right held by U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service on behalf of the Quivira National Wildlife Refuge.268 
KDA-DWR has rejected these plans principally because they have yet to 
recommend reductions in pumping and rely instead upon changes in irrigation 
mechanics and the development of a stream augmentation project.269 
Why the disparity among LEMA plans? The first reason is hydrological. In 
non-renewable groundwater basins such as GMD1, where pumping has severely 
and permanently depleted the aquifer, any reductions in pumping levels that slow 
the rate of decline appear to satisfy the general conditions of the LEMA statute 
and thus provide sufficient grounds for approval by the Chief Engineer.270 
Sometimes, the simplest explanation is the best one. The Chief Engineer does not 
want to impede local groundwater conservation efforts, even if those efforts may 
not achieve much over the long term. 
That bureaucratic tendency provides the second reason for the disparity 
among LEMA plans—the politics of groundwater jurisdiction. Groundwater 
irrigation communities generally see themselves differently than surface-water 
irrigation communities, and view the regulation of their water rights differently 
as well.271 Surface-water communities hold senior rights and depend on rivers 
and streams that flow across different regions of a state; they often divert water 
from a distant basin.272 By contrast, groundwater irrigation communities hold 
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relatively junior rights and can claim that “their” water supplies are essentially 
local—and state statutes often support these claims.273 Given the political power 
of groundwater districts across the West, it is easy to see why a state water 
engineer will approve local initiatives for strong groundwater conservation plans. 
Regarding the GMD4 Sheridan-6 plans, the locals wanted substantial pumping 
reductions, the ambition of the LEMA statute is to promote such reductions, and 
the KWAA explicitly requires the Chief Engineer to conserve the state’s water 
resources.274 Approving their plan was relatively straightforward. 
The harder issue arises when the local GMD puts forth a weak plan. The 
locals want it sufficiently to invest in developing such a plan, but the Chief 
Engineer probably has his doubts about the hydrological effectiveness of a weak 
plan over the long term. In this situation, we are seeing the effective deference of 
the Kansas Chief Engineer to the local GMD, both in substantive matters of 
water regulation—over which only the Chief Engineer has jurisdiction—and over 
procedural matters as well. Chief Engineer Earl Lewis admitted as much in 
approving the weak 2020 GMD1 LEMA plan: 
 
The LEMA statute allows groundwater management districts and their 
members to control the destiny of their water use. In this case, GMD 1 
submitted a request for the establishment of the WHC LEMA 
Management Plan, with the goal of limiting irrigation withdrawals. GMD 
1’s Board of Directors evaluated various methods and determined the 
provisions within the WHC LEMA Management Plan were the best 
means to achieve the stated goals. The decisions made by GMD 1’s 
Board of Directors are reasonable, lawful, and appropriate and, as such, 
deference should be given to their decisions.275 
 
This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the LEMA plan’s substantive 
measures, but it is a remarkably candid statement of deference to a local 
groundwater irrigation community. 
Litigation may well provide a third reason for the LEMA plans’ regulatory 
disparities. The 2013 GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA adopted a strong plan, but one 
based on consensus: the irrigators within that 99-square mile area had 
participated closely in the plan’s development and were largely committed to it. 
As the manager of GMD4 stated, “[i]n the end, the consensus was that consensus 
was the preferred approach.”276 Both the proponents of the GMD4 Sheridan-6 
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LEMA and KDA-DWR were prepared for a legal challenge to the plan, but none 
arose. The local consensus over the plan probably explains why its renewal in 
2018 did not provoke a legal challenge as well. By contrast, the 2018 GMD4 
District-Wide LEMA did provoke a legal challenge, but one that failed at the 
district court level and was not appealed.277 The much larger size of the district-
wide LEMA enabled a greater number of plaintiffs to support the lawsuit—
plaintiffs who were not as closely involved in the development of the district-
wide LEMA plan as their counterparts in the Sheridan-6 LEMA had been. 
Moreover, the gravamen of that challenge was about the LEMA statute and less 
about the specific factual findings of KDA-DWR—largely enabling the district 
court to defer to the legislature and to the agency record.278 The 2020 GMD1 
LEMA did not provoke a legal challenge. While it can be difficult to discern why 
the litigation dog does not bark, the relatively small size of that LEMA, together 
with its relatively weak provisions, may well explain the silence.279 
The litigation in GMD5 is of a different order and has placed KDA-DWR 
into a different posture. In 2016, the Chief Engineer found that junior 
groundwater pumping within GMD5 was impairing the senior surface water right 
at the Quivira National Wildlife Refuge.280 Since then, GMD5 has put forth 
several LEMA plans to address that impairment, all of which the Chief Engineer 
has rejected, prompting an administrative challenge in 2019 that remains 
pending.281 Meanwhile, in early 2021, a third-party environmental plaintiff 
brought an action in federal court, alleging that federal law requires the full 
protection of the refuge’s senior water right.282 At present, then, the Chief 
Engineer finds his office placed between a GMD that is hostile to a stronger 
LEMA plan and an environmental plaintiff that is demanding the full restoration 
of the groundwater supply upon which the refuge’s streamflows largely depend. 
Either remedy—a water rights administration plan or a LEMA plan—would 
require substantial and likely permanent pumping reductions. Significantly, the 
environmental plaintiff’s challenge depends largely upon the chief engineer’s 
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uncontested finding of impairment.283 This posture probably explains why he has 
yet to approve a weak LEMA in GMD5. Any LEMA plan that does not address 
the impairment of the wildlife refuge would contradict the chief engineer’s 
impairment finding; if approved, a weak LEMA plan could expose KDA-DWR 
to considerable legal peril if the court finds that the agency did not sufficiently 
protect the refuge’s senior water right. Both are sound reasons for rejecting a 
weak LEMA plan. 
In sum, there is a structural tendency within the LEMA process, inherent 
within the relationship between the Chief Engineer and the GMDs, to defer to the 
local agency on matters of pumping reductions—unless there are previous 
agency decisions or credible litigation threats that serve to counter such 
deference. Absent such decisions and threats, the Chief Engineer will probably 
approve weak, bluewashing plans. 
How, then, to apply that lesson to SGMA? The architects of GSPs need to be 
vigilant to three interrelated areas of the SGMA process which are vulnerable to 
bluewashing. The first area concerns SGMA’s statutory sustainability mandates. 
Granted, these mandates militate against some of the weaknesses that are 
discernible in the LEMA plans. While the IGUCA and LEMA statutes can 
remedy groundwater overdraft over the long term, unlike SGMA, they do not 
require reaching a sustainability goal.284 In California, GSAs will wrestle with 
these mandates. GSAs will likely exploit SGMA’s self-referential definition of 
sustainability to the fullest—something that avoids “an undesirable result,” which 
in turn hinges upon whether a particular hydrological problem is “significant and 
unreasonable”—taking legalistic advantage of the statutory language as well as 
its meanings within the context of earlier adjudications.285 In this regard, SGMA 
promises to generate a substantial body of case law construing the precise 
meaning of its arguably precatory language. 
But there will be a limit to how far that language can be exploited. In several 
important situations, federal environmental law will likely impose clearer and 
more stringent standards of groundwater conservation. The “no jeopardy” 
requirements of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)286 and the 
“take” prohibition in Section 9 of the ESA287 provide immediate baseline 
standards for SGMA’s requirement to consider the water needs of groundwater-
dependent ecosystems.288 Federal wildlife refuge law provides even clearer 
standards.289 The litigation and settlement of federal reserved water rights 
claimed by Native American tribes should produce clear, long-term pumping 
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limits on non-tribal groundwater users.290 SGMA could even enable some useful 
gap-filling. Its requirements to protect against water-quality degradation and to 
consider the needs of disadvantaged communities could lead GSAs to impose 
pumping limits and require injection wells in order to protect against contaminant 
plumes.291 
The second area where SGMA appears to be vulnerable to bluewashing is 
that of procedure. Given the structure of SGMA, it may seem simple enough to 
achieve sustainable long-term management of groundwater: if the GSA proposes 
a deficient plan, the SWRCB can simply intervene and impose one of its own.292 
Woe to the naïve bureaucrat who reads SGMA that way. The Kansas 
groundwater experience shows how centrally imposed groundwater management 
plans are politically unpalatable—to the point of becoming practically 
impossible. The Chief Engineer has long had the power to impose IGUCA plans 
on his own initiative, but he has not done so.293 SGMA recognizes this political 
reality in its structure, just as the LEMA statute does; indeed, that is the 
distinctive characteristic of the latter.294 With that reality in mind, it seems highly 
implausible that the SWRCB will be intervening with supervening GSPs. Much 
more probable is an iterative process through which the SWRCB and the GSA 
work together to reform GSPs into a satisfactory state. That is what has occurred 
with the Kansas LEMAs: for all the GMDs’ procedural autonomy over the 
management plan, and their common-enough antipathy to KDA-DWR, they have 
nonetheless relied heavily upon the expertise of the state.295 SGMA clearly 
provides for similar state assistance.296 The GSAs want their GSPs to be 
approved, and the SWRCB wants SGMA to succeed. Deference to local 
management pervades the politics of groundwater jurisdiction. 
Therein, however, lies a serious hydrological danger. Neither the state nor 
the local GSA will likely insist upon pumping reductions and limitations 
necessary to protect the subject groundwater basin as a functioning hydrological 
system. This is the third and most worrisome area where the SGMA process is 
vulnerable to bluewashing—the closed basin problem.297 
The closed basin problem exists across the West. Under pre-development 
conditions, both surface water and groundwater basins transmit water supplies by 
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surface flows, groundwater baseflow to surface waters, and lateral subsurface 
flow. These basins receive inflows and drain their outflows. Yet even moderate 
amounts of groundwater pumping can lower groundwater levels, preventing the 
drainage of water from these basins, effectively closing them. Water supplies that 
used to flow across and through the basin are captured by pumping; most of the 
formerly flowing groundwater exits the basin not through baseflow or lateral 
subsurface flow, but through evapotranspiration by irrigated crops and land. 
Because the dissolved solids in groundwater can no longer escape through 
baseflow and lateral subsurface flow, the newly closed basins suffer increasing 
concentrations of salts, arsenic, uranium, and other contaminants; the formerly 
open basin turns into a “salt sink.”298 
As a consequence of this process, known as “anthropogenic basin closure,” 
formerly open basins in the Central Valley such as the Tulare Lake Basin are 
suffering from induced concentrations of salts similar to those found in naturally-
closed basins such as Death Valley or the Great Salt Lake.299 A variation of this 
problem is also occurring in the Arkansas River Valley of eastern Colorado and 
western Kansas. There, groundwater irrigation has lowered the alluvial aquifer; 
polluted irrigation return flows have percolated down to the aquifer, 
concentrating geogenic heavy metals in the alluvium. In 2016, Colorado 
delivered between eight and ten tons of geogenic uranium to Kansas via the 
Arkansas River, and concentrated pollutants have also seeped into the High 
Plains-Ogallala Aquifer, forcing the town of Kinsley, Kansas to build a reverse-
osmosis drinking water treatment plant.300 Left unchecked, the closed basin 
problem will inevitably render groundwater supplies unusable without expensive 
desalination and other treatment—treatment that is probably not economical at 
the scale necessary for large-scale irrigation. 
In the abstract, the solution to the closed basin problem is simple: impose a 
groundwater management regime that reopens the basin by restoring and 
maintaining sufficient inflows and outflows. Such a regime would reduce 
pumping to amounts necessary to maximize recharge and to maintain open, 
flowing conditions. A necessary component of such a regime would likely be 
aquifer storage, which would enable stable and higher groundwater levels, 
helping to keep the basin open.301 But that simple—and hydrologically 
necessary—solution would almost certainly require reductions in groundwater 
pumping well beyond those necessary to attain the “squishy” statutory 
requirements of SGMA. GSAs and the SWRCB will need to fight the long-
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established institutional tendency of considering river and groundwater basins 
essentially as the sum of their discrete water rights claims under a typical safe 
yield analysis.302 SGMA’s statutory requirement to consider previously 
unrecognized uses such as environmental users of groundwater is not, in itself, 
sufficient. Such consideration may force the reapportionment of the safe yield of 
the basin, but if that total safe yield figure does not incorporate groundwater 
amounts necessary to maintain an open basin, SGMA will fail its mandate to 
reverse “significant and unreasonable degraded water quality” over the long 
term.303 
C. Lesson Two: Doctrine is Negotiable 
The second lesson to be gleaned from the LEMA experience so far is that 
water law doctrine can be fundamentally negotiable. In Kansas, negotiability has 
proven to be perhaps the most important component in reaching consensus about 
basin-wide reductions in groundwater pumping. 
As described above in Section II.A, the LEMAs provide consistent examples 
of owners modifying several of the cardinal rules of the prior appropriation 
doctrine as it is codified in Kansas. They have compromised over priority. 
Pumping reductions apply to all appropriation rights dedicated to irrigation 
without regard to priority, but owners of senior rights can still bring impairment 
claims against junior rights.304 Instead of annual pumping limits, they have 
adopted multi-year allocations to allow them greater temporal flexibility.305 They 
have accomplished substantial geographical flexibility by allowing water usage 
across different points of diversion and different places of use.306 And they have 
established clear use preferences, imposing lesser (if any) pumping reductions on 
higher-value uses such as stockwatering, municipal, and recreational rights than 
they have upon irrigation rights.307 
Such negotiations over the prior appropriation doctrine in Kansas raise 
hopeful signs for how GSAs and irrigators can negotiate across the generally 
wider latitude of California’s correlative rights doctrine. SGMA neither creates, 
nor determines, nor comments upon California’s common-law property rights 
regime.308 SGMA does not displace the common law.309 But where the common 
law is silent, GSPs can articulate rules. Thus, there is an opportunity within the 
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SGMA process to establish creative, consensus-based, and effective descriptions 
of allowable water usage without running afoul of California water law. Put 
another way, SGMA provides room for the kind of “doctrinal choreography” and 
practical equity that Pasadena achieved—but with statutory protections 
previously unavailable under the common law.310 Because the correlative rights 
doctrine imposes fewer limitations than the prior appropriation doctrine does, the 
dancing can be freer and safer. 
GSAs can negotiate and modify the correlative rights doctrine pursuant to 
SGMA in many of the same ways as GMDs have negotiated and modified the 
prior appropriation doctrine in Kansas. First, through voluntary agreements 
within a GSP, they can reach compromises over priority—in the California sense 
of that term. They can adjust the relationship between overlying, correlative 
rights and off-tract appropriative rights by applying the same level of pumping 
reductions to both classes of rights; there need not be a hierarchy between the 
classes. And just as appropriators in LEMAs retain the “backstop” ability to 
bring impairment actions, overlying landowners could bring protective actions 
against out-of-basin users, or make contractual arrangements allowing the latter 
to keep pumping. Because overlying tract owners can raise their inchoate rights 
at any time against out-of-basin appropriators, such a provision will likely 
become attractive.311 
Second, GSAs will likely adopt the temporal flexibility afforded by multi-
year allocations of water use and the geographical flexibility afforded by 
temporary and permanent transfers within the boundaries of the GSA. SGMA 
provides for both of these management tools.312 Converting annual authorized 
quantities of use into five-year allocations is a common enough approach to 
dealing with groundwater overdraft in prior appropriation states.313 Carryovers 
across multi-year allocation periods could reward conservation, similar to what 
has been done in the GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA.314 Like the LEMA plans, 
SGMA’s carryover provision is annual but sets a five-year limit.315 SGMA’s 
provision for geographical flexibility within the GSA’s subject basin accords 
with longstanding California’s correlative rights doctrine, which treats all in-
basin pumpers as overlying owners.316 
Statute, however, will impose some limits on the geographical flexibility of 
pumping allocations—especially § 1200.317 In a relatively recent but pre-SGMA 
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case, the SWRCB secured judicial approval of the board’s updated test for 
determining whether a groundwater formation qualified as a “subterranean 
stream flowing through known and definite channels” or was instead classified as 
“percolating groundwater.”318 The decision was hailed as a “major step forward 
toward the integration of ground and surface water rights” in California.319 
SGMA builds on that decision. Moving groundwater pumping into a geological 
formation that qualifies as a “subterranean stream” would clearly run afoul of 
SGMA’s call to avoid depletions of interconnected surface water.320 
Third, GSAs could craft use preferences within their GSPs. The Kansas 
LEMAs either subject higher-value uses to lesser pumping reductions or none at 
all.321 Similar provisions could be tailored to address the economic diversity of 
crops within the San Joaquin Valley, from lower-value crops such as hay and 
alfalfa to high-value crops such as almonds. In the abstract, a use preference 
seems economically rational. However, the much higher value of California 
crops (and the vertically-integrated aspects of many California agribusinesses) 
may reduce the appeal of a use preference. High Plains irrigators dedicate much 
of their acreages to growing feed grains (corn, soybeans, and grain sorghum) for 
beef and dairy cattle, hogs, and other livestock; they sell a large part of their 
harvests to feedlots and other large-scale buyers such as ethanol plants. Thus, it is 
in most irrigators’ self-interest to adopt LEMA provisions that protect the buyers 
of their output.322 California irrigators, who focus largely on the consumer 
market, do not suffer the same level of dependence on higher-value uses. 
D. Lesson Three: Trustworthy Data and Data Analysis are Crucial to Promoting 
a Culture of Conservation 
The final and perhaps most intriguing lesson from the LEMA experience 
concerns a resource that, like groundwater, is in a state of serious depletion 
across the country: trust. The LEMA statute emerged because local irrigators did 
not trust the procedures of the IGUCA statutes to safeguard their local 
management initiatives; the LEMA statute distinguishes itself by providing such 
safeguards.323 The first LEMA, the 2013 Sheridan-6 LEMA, emerged from a 
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shared commitment to groundwater conservation among a limited number of 
irrigators who trusted each other enough to develop a serious groundwater 
conservation plan, one that would affect all of their water rights equally. They 
trusted the plan because it was anchored in hydrogeological data—pumping 
amounts, pumping rates, and local groundwater levels—that was both publicly 
available and widely trusted. Kansas has long required water-use reporting, and 
imposes civil penalties for failing to report as well as misdemeanor penalties for 
reporting false information.324 Over 99% of Kansas water rights owners comply 
with these requirements.325 The development of the LEMA plans has depended 
substantially upon such user-reported data, but also upon the independent well 
measurements and analyses of the Kansas Geological Survey, whose work 
Kansas irrigators clearly hold in high regard.326 The orders establishing the 
LEMAs have detailed and exceptional provisions for water-use reporting and 
monitoring.327 Just as importantly, they set forth different burdens and 
presumptions for establishing pumping violations, and impose considerably more 
severe penalties where such violations are established.328 
California groundwater irrigators are no better or worse than their Kansas 
counterparts, but they occupy a much different regulatory situation, and thus 
have a much different relationship with pumping and monitoring data. Because 
pumping was effectively unregulated before the advent of SGMA, California 
irrigators have not been required to meter or monitor their wells. In the context of 
long-established non-regulation, mandatory metering and reporting requirements 
can promote the suspicion among irrigators that the state is planning to curtail 
pumping—a suspicion that is not necessarily unjustified. In many western states, 
groundwater metering requirements are remarkably recent.329 SGMA clearly 
grants GSAs the power to require well registration, metering, and groundwater 
level monitoring.330 
In the meantime, hydrogeologists and other scientists have developed 
sophisticated ways to otherwise measure the impacts of pumping on the San 
Joaquin Valley’s groundwater systems. Unlike their data-rich colleagues in 
Kansas, they lack direct pumping and water-use information. Yet scientists have 
discovered impressive ways to compensate for this data drought. For example, 
they have developed a combination of satellite-based interferometic synthetic 
aperture radar (InSAR) and continuous global positioning systems (GPS), along 
with conventional surface flow routing, precipitation, and runoff data.331 This 
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hybrid approach does more than estimate groundwater pumping by the rough 
proxy of land subsidence. GPS-enhanced InSAR measures land surface 
deformations and displacements—the geological responses to groundwater 
pumping—at an impressively small land-area scale of 100 meters on a side. This 
data, interpreted in tandem with conventional surface water data, has enabled 
scientists to locate and describe groundwater recharge locations and lateral 
groundwater flow paths.332 This research has produced nothing less than a finely 
resolved map of the seasonal groundwater dynamics of the San Joaquin Valley. 
Between the new powers vested in GSAs to impose metering and monitoring 
and the advanced state of remote analysis, SGMA has spurred remarkable 
advancements in what California irrigators know about their individual and 
collective pumping impacts. But two questions loom large. Will pumpers trust 
that data and analysis—and the motives behind it? And if they do, will they 
support their local GSA in imposing penalties—including, potentially, severe 
ones—for those who violate the provisions of a GSP?333 
The Kansas experience may be less helpful in answering these questions. 
Most importantly, LEMAs are voluntary, while GSPs are not. Proponents of the 
GMD4 Sheridan-6 LEMA earnestly wanted the plan to succeed and recognized 
the personal and institutional trust required to do so; the prospect of failure raised 
the specter of shame.334 Irrigators within a California GSA may not have the 
same authorial interest or pride in their GSP as their Kansas counterparts. 
Irrigators across the Central Valley will likely view SGMA essentially as state-
imposed, top-down regulation, and hardly as an opportunity to find creative ways 
to conserve groundwater. But they will still have strong incentives for developing 
effective compliance mechanisms—most importantly, to avoid the SWRCB from 
intervening to force the reformation of a GSP.335 Because California groundwater 
was basically unregulated until the onset of SGMA, there is little of the 
regulatory inertia that might otherwise impede the adoption of creative and 
effective enforcement mechanisms. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Comparisons such as the one put forth in this Article are fraught with 
hazards—even within the narrow category of American groundwater 
management. But they are not merely academic. Most of California’s agricultural 
economy depends upon whether it can achieve the grand ambitions set forth in 
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SGMA. The Central Valley Aquifer has at least three times the water storage 
capacity than California’s entire surface reservoir storage capacity.336 Whether 
that aquifer is sustained, depleted, or destroyed will determine the Central 
Valley’s future. In looking for ways to implement SGMA’s grand ambitions, 
California could do worse than to look beyond its borders and linger a bit across 
the High Plains of western Kansas. 
As this Article has argued, there are lessons to be found there. Thanks to the 
pioneering work of Elinor Ostrom, Edella Schlager, William Blomquist, and 
others, we have learned that the use of common-pool groundwater resources can 
be governed effectively and that effective governance displays common 
principles and institutional arrangements.337 (They have also tended to look most 
often to California.) This Article has attempted to show that there is an overall, 
practical similarity between the Kansas groundwater experience and what 
California currently faces; there is also enough in the Kansas LEMA record so 
far to attend usefully to practices.338 Most importantly, Kansas groundwater 
irrigators have achieved a workable and proactive consensus about groundwater 
conservation, one that applies across their discrete, conflicting water rights and 
their distinct groundwater situations. Lee Anne Fennell has memorably 
articulated “Ostrom’s Law” to hold that “a resource arrangement that works in 
practice can work in theory.”339 Practices that work in Kansas may work in 
California, and that common effectiveness may enable us to recognize 
regularities across their diverse hydrological and legal contexts. Then, perhaps, a 
theory or a set of theories about locally-driven groundwater conservation 
mandates will emerge, allowing us to assess which models work in which 
contexts, and to “thereby dodge both misguided efforts at transplantation and 
missed opportunities to tap into transferable lessons.”340 Let us hope there is time 
to do so in California. In many parts of Kansas, it is nearly too late. 
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